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INTRODUCTION
Penny White'
When the staff of the Tennessee Journalof Law and
Policy began to discuss a topic for their Spring 2006
Symposium, their focus quickly became the Tennessee
Supreme Court. For the first time in history, three
outstanding justices of longstanding tenure were
announcing their upcoming retirements. As we considered
the many contributions that Justices Anderson, Birch, and
Drowota had made to the Court, to the profession, and to
the state, the Symposium topic became obvious. What was
much more difficult was trying to narrow the particular
subject matters for discussion. After consulting with
lawyers, judges, and law professors, the Journal staff
decided on a format that would allow discussion not only of
the justices' contributions but of the justices themselves. In
this way, we would honor the individuals' personal and
professional legacies.
Two substantive topics emerged among the many
considered as symbolic of the justices lasting impact on the
profession. The first was comparative fault, which we
believed would generate a lively discussion of how the
Court's decision in McIntyre v. Balentine2 and its progeny
had changed tort law in Tennessee. The second topic was
professionalism.
Specifically, the Journal wanted to
highlight the leadership role the Court had played in
promoting public confidence in the profession and public
access to the courts through programs like SCALES
(Supreme Court Advancing Legal Education for Students)

Penny White is an Associate Professor at the University of Tennessee
College of Law.
2 McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992).
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and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 30, commonly known

as the "Cameras in the Courtroom" rule.3
The Journal staff selected excellent representatives
among the Bench and the Bar to address the two topics
from a variety of perspectives. In addition, the staff invited
former and current judicial clerks for each of the justices to
bring a personal message about each of the honorees. The
participants engaged the audience with wonderful stories,
memories, and highlights of the combined eighty years of
judicial service. The reactions of the in-person audience of
federal and state judges, lawyers, law professors, law
students, and citizens proved that the Journal staff's
intuition was right - "The Tennessee Supreme Court's
Impact on Law and Policy: Celebrating the Legacies of
Justices Anderson, Birch, and Drowota" was an ideal
Symposium topic.
The Journal staff brings you this Symposium
edition, a near transcript of that memorable event, in the
hope that you, like those present at the event, will have the
opportunity to reflect upon the remarkable contributions of
these three legal giants. As one of two faculty advisors to
the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, I am as proud of
the staff's accomplishments with this Symposium as I was
to be the former colleague of our retiring justices.

3 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 30.
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DEAN THOMAS GALLIGAN: Good afternoon. I am
Tom Galligan, the Dean of the University of Tennessee
College of Law, and it is my privilege to welcome you this
afternoon to the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy's
symposium, "The Tennessee Supreme Court's Impact on
Law and Policy: Celebrating the Legacies of Justices
Anderson, Birch, and Drowota."
This is a very special day for us at the College of
Law. It's a special day because today we honor and
analyze the very positive and significant impact of three
great Tennessee jurists: Justice Riley Anderson, Justice
Adolpho Birch, and Justice Frank Drowota. One, Justice
The others, Justices
Drowota, has already retired.
Anderson and Birch, will retire this year.
Together and individually, they have moved the
Tennessee Supreme Court and the administration of justice
in our state and our nation forward over their long and very
distinguished careers. We are extremely honored that each
of them could be with us this afternoon. We are also
extremely honored to have so many other distinguished
guests here from the federal bench, from the state bench,
from our faculty, from our students, and from our
colleagues. We're glad that you are here.
Before I sit down, let me also praise and thank the
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy for putting this
important symposium together. Joseph Hyder and his
colleagues along with their faculty advisors, Professor
Penny White and Professor Otis Stephens, have done a
truly fabulous job putting this incredible tribute and
program together. Welcome and enjoy the afternoon.
MR. JOSEPH HYDER: Thank you, Dean Galligan, for
that welcome, and more importantly, I would like to thank
you for your years of service to this law school and for your
steadfast support for the Tennessee Journal of Law and
Policy.

14
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It was only a few years ago when a couple of
students went to Dean Galligan with a crazy idea about
starting a new journal here at the College of Law. Instead
of laughing at those students, he decided to get behind the
idea and to make it a reality. Without your energy,
enthusiasm, and support, the Tennessee Journal of Law and
Policy would not be the success that it is today. For that we
thank you, and you will be dearly missed.
While I am thanking people, I would be remiss if I
did not thank two members of the Journal who made this
symposium possible. Maha Ayesh and Kelly Randall
worked tirelessly along with one of the Journal's faculty
advisors, Professor Penny White, to create what will be an
informative and enjoyable program. If it is not, then you
now know who to blame.
Seriously, they have put together a remarkable
program because we have three of Tennessee's greatest and
most influential jurists gathered in this room today.
Justices Adolpho Birch, Jr., E. Riley Anderson, and Frank
F. Drowota, III have more than fifty years of combined
service on the Tennessee Supreme Court and over ninety
years combined judicial experience. What a remarkable
achievement to say the least.
In light of their recent retirement announcements,
the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy and the
University of Tennessee College of Law felt that it would
be proper to examine the impact that these justices have
had on law and policy in Tennessee while also honoring the
extraordinary gentlemen behind the accomplishments.
Today's symposium will be divided into two
portions. First, we will have two panels that will examine
contributions that the Tennessee Supreme Court has made
to Tennessee jurisprudence over the last twenty-five years.
After a short break, we will have a current or former law
clerk for each justice present a brief tribute to the justice for
whom they worked. Each tribute will then be followed by
a response from that justice.

15
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Our first panel will be moderated by Kelly Randall,
who is the incoming Editor-in-Chief of the Tennessee
Journalof Law and Policy, and she will be moderating the
panels on professional ethics, public confidence in the
judiciary, and public access to the courts. Kelly, I will turn
it over to you.
MS. KELLY RANDALL: Thank you, everyone, for
attending. Good afternoon. I am Kelly Randall. Welcome
to our symposium. Our panel today will focus on three
specific programs in the Tennessee Supreme Court. First,
in the area of professionalism, the Supreme Court adopted
rules pertaining to specialization which help identify
lawyer practice areas for the public. The Court 4 also began
posting information on the web about disciplinary action as
well as information for members of the public who had
complaints about lawyers.
Next, the SCALES program is an American Bar
Association award-winning program founded by Justice
Anderson that takes the Court to the people. The Court
hears its docket in a high school where the students have
been prepared for the cases of the day. Justices meet with
the students afterwards to discuss the cases.
Finally, "Cameras in the Courtroom" is another
program that increases the public access to the courts that
was piloted by Justice Anderson when he was Chief
Justice. It was experimented with in many high profile
cases such as the case of State v. Huskey,5 which Judge
Baumgartner tried.

4 The

Tennessee Journalof Law and Policy's Editorial Board chose to
capitalize "court" throughout this issue when referring to the Tennessee
Supreme Court. We made this decision because this symposium was
held in honor of the Tennessee Supreme Court's contributions to
Tennessee jurisprudence.
5 State v. Huskey, 964 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn. 1998).
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INTRODUCTION
I will introduce each of our speakers and allow
them to speak, and then we will have a brief question and
answer session.
First, Mr. Lance Bracy is Chief
Disciplinary Counsel for the Tennessee Board of
Professional Responsibility. He has served the Tennessee
Supreme Court in that capacity since 1979.
COMMENTS OF LANCE BRACY
MR. LANCE BRACY:
I thank the University of
Tennessee College of Law for sponsoring this symposium
celebrating the legacies of Justices Drowota, Anderson, and
Birch. I am very honored to be a participant.
I will identify some of what are believed to be the
most significant benchmarks in the development of
professional ethics in Tennessee that are attributed to the
stewardship and legacies of Justices Drowota, Anderson,
and Birch.
The first and likely the most significant
development occurred in 1980, the year that Justice
Drowota was elected to the Supreme Court. This is the
year the Court empowered its Board of Professional
Responsibility to issue ethics opinions. The concept of
providing guidance to lawyers about ethical dilemmas
came about due to the compounding increase of ethical
complaints, which had been increasing at the rate of
approximately 15% each year since the Board's inception in
1976.6 The objective was to preemptively assist lawyers in
identifying and resolving ethical issues and thereby avoid
ethical complaints being filed.

6 Tenn.

Bd. of Prof. Responsibility.org, Annual Reports,

http://www.tbpr.org/NewsAndPublications/AnnualReports/.html (last
visited July 29, 2007) [hereinafter T.B.P.R.].
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Other benchmarks in the 1980s, during Justice
Drowota's tenure, which had a significant impact on ethics
and professionalism were as follows:
e providing for immediate and summary suspensions
of lawyers who had misappropriated trust funds, failed to
respond to a disciplinary complaint, or posed a threat of
irreparable public harm;
* providing for lawyers to acquire twelve hours of
annual continuing legal education credits; and
* creating the Lawyers Fund for Client Protection.
The decade of the 1990s brought Justices Anderson
and Birch to the Supreme Court. During that period, in
1993, a significant benchmark in the development of
professional ethics occurred with the requirement of three
hours of annual ethics and professionalism credits in
addition to the twelve hours of general continuing legal
education credits. This development spawned a new and
heightened focus on ethics and professionalism.
In 1994, a significant development occurred when a
program was implemented to detect and prevent trust
account violations. This program, known as the Overdraft
Notification Program, was a proactive response to the
problem of theft by a small yet significant segment of the
bar.
The program requires that trust accounts be
maintained only in financial institutions which agree to
report overdrafts in trust accounts. More than 300 financial
institutions are participating in this program. 7
A major development occurred in 1999 with the
implementation of the Tennessee Lawyers Assistance
Program, which was designed to protect the public from
harm caused by impaired lawyers or judges, to assist
impaired members of the legal profession to begin and
continue recovery, and to educate the bench and bar as to
causes and remedies for impairments. The legal profession
currently contributes approximately $350,000 annually to
7 T.B.P.R., supra note 6.
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support this program, which arguably ranks
in the top three
nationwide. 8

lawyer assistance programs
Justice Birch served as the Supreme Court's liaison
to the Board for the past twelve years, from 1993 to 2005,
during which many of these and other significant
benchmarks occurred. We are indeed very grateful for his
services during these fruitful years. Some of the other
important developments during the tenure of Justice Birch
as liaison to the Board are as follows:
* Membership on the Board was expanded to include
three lay members, thereby expanding the Board's
perspective and outlook;
0 The confidentiality rule was revisited, broadened,
and expanded to present more openness and visibility about
the actions of the Board;
* A diversion program was created to permit
professionalism enhancement for lawyers engaged in minor
infractions;
* A consumer assistance program was implemented
to mediate minor client-attorney misunderstandings,
permitting their relationships to be restored and enhanced,
and also to provide referrals to consumers to appropriate
resources and programs, such as lawyer referral and fee
dispute alternatives; and
* Finally, a robust website was implemented that
provides user-friendly resources to lawyers and consumers
using lawyers, including online ethics inquiries by lawyers.
These and other progressive developments during
Justice Birch's tenure and service to the Board have
resulted in a turning point in professional ethics in
Tennessee, as evidenced in the following comparison and
analysis of current data and statistics.
In 1980 during the initial year of the
implementation of the Board's ethics opinion service, the
Board issued three formal ethics opinions, and Disciplinary
8 T.B.P.R.,

supra note 6.
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This
Counsel issued forty-nine advisory opinions.
proactive program to prevent ethical misconduct has
resulted in 163 formal ethics opinions and 837 advisory
opinions, and the Disciplinary Counsel's staff has
telephone inquiries
responded to more than 55,000 hotline
9
from attorneys seeking guidance.
The Board received 288 overdraft notices in 1995,0
the initial year of the implementation of that program.'
Only sixty-one overdraft notices were received last year
indicating a 78% decline from those reported in 1995 and
further indicating that lawyers have become more
proficient in maintaining appropriate trust accounts." I
In 1980, there were approximately 7,800 active
lawyers in Tennessee at which time there were
approximately 450 complaint files opened, a ratio of one
12
complaint file for every seventeen lawyers in Tennessee.
Complaints per lawyer peaked in 1998 when approximately
1,700 complaint files were opened with an active lawyer
population of nearly 15,000, a ratio of one complaint for
every 8.7 lawyers which was nearly double the ratio of one
to seventeen in 1980.13 This steady and significant increase
in complaints was a major source of motivation for the
proactive measures which have been identified.
The year 1999 ushered in a watershed era when the
cumulative effects of these proactive measures began to
reflect a decrease in complaints, a trend which has
continued and is continuing with few exceptions. For
instance, last year there were approximately 982 complaint
files opened compared to 1,655 opened in 1998,
representing a 40% decline in the complaint files opened in
the past seven years. 14 The cumulative effect of the
9 T.B.P.R., supra note 6.
10T.B.P.R., supra note 6.
11T.B.P.R.,
12T.B.P.R.,
13 T.B.P.R.,
14 T.B.P.R.,

supra note 6.
supra note 6.
supra note 6.

supra note 6.
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disciplinary efforts of the Board have resulted in 155
disbarments, 281 suspensions, 436 censures, and 2,695
reprimands or admonitions from the 36,000 complaints that
have been filed since the inception of the Board. 5 This has
also been a major factor in the declining trend of
complaints.
During 1999, the Supreme Court, in its supervisory
role relating to the ethical conduct of lawyers, identified
several issues or objectives for a performance audit of the
activities of the Board. In May 2000, a report of the
Comptroller of the Treasury, Division of State Audit,
concluded that "the operations of the Board of Professional
Responsibility are efficient, effective, and are achieving
the
6
results desired by the Tennessee Supreme Court."'
Also during 1999, a nationwide survey of fifty-six
disciplinary agencies conducted by the American Bar
Association revealed that Tennessee ranked 16th in public
sanctions issued during that year, 2 2nd in complaints filed,
14th in lawyers formally charged, and 12' in private
17
sanctions, while ranking 2 7th in funding received.
In August 2003, the ABA Standing Committee on
Professional Discipline issued its report on the Tennessee
Lawyer Regulation System, in a response to a request by
the Supreme Court to identify the Board's strengths,
structure, rules, and resources. An advisory committee of
nine members was designated by the Supreme Court to
review the recommendations of the ABA report. The
Court's advisory committee report, filed in June 2004,
concluded that the "current lawyer disciplinary system
generally functions effectively and efficiently."

15 T.B.P.R., supra note 6.
16T.B.P.R., supra note 6.
17
Am. Bar Assoc. Ctr. for Prof. Responsibility.org, Survey on Lawyer
Discipline Sys., http://www.abanet.org/cpr/discipline/sold/toc_9899.html (last visited July 29, 2007).
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Last fall, a staff writer from The Tennessean began
an inquiry of the operations of the Board as a major news
item. After many weeks of inquiry, The Tennessean
published its report consisting of a front page headline and
above-the-fold article in its November 25, 2005
publication. The article explained how complaints are
filed, identified types of complaints, and cited disciplinary
data for the last seven years. In conclusion, "[s]ince its
inception in 1976, the Board of Professional Responsibility
has fielded thousands of reports from disgruntled
Tennessee clients complaining of everything from being
over-billing,
unable to get their lawyers on the phone to
'1 8
stealing money and poor legal performance."
The following week, on November 30, 2005, the
Editorial Board of The Tennessean published an editorial
on the Tennessee Lawyer Discipline Program, appearing on
the editorial page with the following caption: "Supreme
Court has Effective Program to Investigate and Address
Problems."' The editorial goes on to state in part:
the
appreciate
should
Tennesseans
Supreme
the
Tennessee
that
seriousness
Court gives to professionalism and ethics
among lawyers. The state is better for it.
The legal profession in Tennessee is much
better for it.
The State Supreme Court's Board of
Professional Responsibility, which is
comprised of nine attorneys and three nonattorneys, supervises the ethical conduct of
lawyers in Tennessee. Although the Board
may be best known for receiving and
investigating complaints against lawyers, it
also works to foster greater understanding
18 Sheila

Burke, Complaints againstLawyers Go Up, THE

TENNESSEAN,

Nov. 25, 2005, at IA.
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among lawyers about ethical obligations
through its ethics hot line and its seminars.
Additionally, it operates a consumer
assistance program that offers suggestions
on hiring an attorney and on fostering better
communication between attorneys and
clients.
[C]onsumers need to know that
their grievances will be heard and
investigated. And the lawyers need to know
that frivolous9 complaints will not count
against them.'
In conclusion, Mr. Justice Drowota, Mr. Justice
Anderson, and Mr. Justice Birch: We are grateful for your
significant efforts in bringing the state of legal ethics and
professionalism in Tennessee to the forefront and within
what I believe is among the top five lawyer-regulation
systems nationwide. We applaud your faithful stewardship.
INTRODUCTION
MS. KELLY RANDALL: Thank you, Mr. Bracy. Next
we have Ms. Sue Allison, who is the Public Information
Officer for the Tennessee Supreme Court. She has served
in that capacity as spokesperson for the Court since 1993.
COMMENTS OF SUE ALLISON
MS. SUE ALLISON: First-this will not surprise anybody
that knows me-I got up this morning, and I was having
allergies. So I picked up a bottle of allergy medicine and
took a great big swig, and it was nighttime allergy
19Editorial, Lawyer Complaints Increase, THE TENNESSEAN, Dec. 1,

2005, 10A.

23

3:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

24

medicine. So if I start talking about something else, that's
what it is. For that reason, I will probably read my talking
points.
Before I talk about one of the Court's truly most
successful outreach programs, the SCALES program, I
need to lay a little groundwork. For sixteen years this
Court more so than any other, probably any other in the
nation, has been committed to being open and accessible.
It is just incredible. I hear stories from Public Information
Officers in other states, and I feel so blessed.
In 1993, three years after the 1990 Court really kind
of made that commitment, the Court created the position of
Public Information Officer as part of that commitment. By
the grace of God, I was fortunate enough to be hired, and
especially because-I love this-among the people I beat
out-there were a lot of applicants-was a stripper named
Cherry who kept sending the screening committee baskets
of cherry products, cherry preserves, and cherry candy. So
anyway, I am quite honored that I got the job.
Creating the Public Information Officer position
was just one of many steps this Court has taken to help the
citizens of Tennessee feel like they are in touch with the
court system, with the judicial branch, and like they have a
right to know what their court system is doing.
One thing I will mention in passing for those who
may not be familiar with it, is that we have a fabulous
website. We post not only opinions but-there is just so
much information, including a section for children. We
have just recently made the web address something that
you can actually remember and write down without having
It is now
two or three sheets of paper.
www.tenncourts.gov, and it really is a great tool for law
students.
The justices on this Court give of themselves in so
many ways. They speak to civic clubs, and they speak at
schools. They do many, many things. The Chief Justice is
speaking at a high school graduation in my home town next
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month, I think. So, I mean, they do many, many things, but
they wanted to do more. They wanted to help young
Tennesseans grow up with an understanding of the judicial
branch, which is the neglected branch of government as far
as civics classes go: what it does for them, how it works,
and how it affects their lives. We all realize this; we all
learn how a bill becomes law, but nobody knows much
about the judicial branch. So the Court wanted to address
that problem.
In 1995, then Chief Justice Anderson and the Court
initiated a program to make it possible for high school
students across the state to attend oral arguments in their
own or a nearby community. Obviously, the students
cannot all be bussed to Nashville, Jackson, or Knoxville to
hear oral arguments. SCALES is an acronym for the
Supreme Court Advancing Legal Education for Students,
and Sherry Ross right over there came up with the
acronym. We were all trying to think of something, and
Sherry did. It has been hugely successful in the last eleven
years.
Since the first SCALES program in Murfreesboro,
more than 15,000 high school students including homeschoolers have participated from 337 schools across the
state. Some of the students who are attending or have
attended law school here may have been inspired to do so
when they participated in SCALES. We hear that a lot.
As Professor White knows, then Justice White,
SCALES takes a tremendous amount of effort by many,
many people including the Court, lawyers who are arguing
the cases and have to pack up and go to Dresden or Clinton
or different places, the local judges, and the bar. It is a real
group effort, but I think the students who participated,
those 15,000 students, will tell you it is well worth the
effort.
When a community is chosen to host SCALES at
the request of the local judge or the bar, several months of
planning take place; several months of labor take place.

25

3:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 26

For one thing, the Court flags potential SCALES cases.
These are cases with issues that might be interesting to
students. We have had death penalty cases, which are
always popular. I remember a date rape case that was quite
popular.
And-this is one of my favorites-the community
always hosts a luncheon for the students and the Court. I
will get into that, but at this particular SCALES Kentucky
Fried Chicken was donating the luncheon. I did not know
that, and the Court did not know that. I am reading the
issues in the cases, and one of them was food poisoning at
Kentucky Fried Chicken. So we had to quickly-rather
than change the case, we had to change the lunch. But it
was-it could have been an awkward situation because
KFC was donating the food.
But anyway, teachers whose classes are going to
participate attend a three-hour in-service training session.
Our office, the Administrative Office of the Court, oversees
that, but an appellate judge from the Tennessee Court of
Appeals or Court of Criminal Appeals is actually the
teacher for the session. They review the cases that the
students are going to hear, the issues in those cases. They
discuss the state and federal court systems. It is amazing.
The teachers are very open about the fact that they know
very, very little about the court system. They are really
grateful.
The teachers are given huge notebooks of
material to take back and use in the classroom and
handbooks for each of the students that has general
information about the system as well as detailed
information about the cases they are going to hear.
Then-we are not through yet-local judges and
attorneys from the community go into the classrooms
before the students who will hear the oral arguments, and
they review again the cases they are going to hear. So the
students, when they get to oral arguments, know as much as
the attorneys do really. They could actually probably argue
the cases.
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The students are divided into groups, and each
group hears one case. Following oral arguments, the
students have an opportunity that I have always thought
was the most fun, and I think maybe they do too. They go
into another room while the next group comes into the
courtroom with the attorneys who argued the case, and they
are allowed to ask no-holds-barred, anything they want.
They generally ask fantastic questions, better than the
Court sometimes. They have gotten to hear them, but they
are really great questions.
A couple of times the attorneys have brought the
parties in and let the kids ask the parties questions which
was interesting. One was-I remember it was really
moving-a man in Memphis whose wife had been
murdered at a Wal-Mart. It was actually a civil case
involving Wal-Mart. He came in and answered questions
for the students. He described it, and it was just a real
moving debriefing. Those are just really wonderful for the
students, and I wish the Court could attend. They would be
impressed.
All of the students gather for lunch with members
of the Court, local judges, other local officials, and some
legislators. The lunches, as I said, are sponsored locally, so
there is no taxpayer cost. I need to mention the Frist
Foundation here too, which has been very generous with
the SCALES program and, therefore, allowed us to provide
materials. The students get scales of justice lapel pins and
some other things that we could not do with tax money. So
thank you to the Frist Foundation, and thank you to Judge
Drowota.
During lunch, a great part of the program, the Court
members sit with the students, and they talk about
everything from their hopes for the future to their teenage
romances or the prom, whatever. The students really enjoy
that. And I have to say that Justice White-we were
talking about this on the way up. I rode up with Judge
Drowota-always it was like flies around something. All
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the little girls would swarm around Justice White. I do not
know what it was, but I think I do. I mean, we are real
comfortable with them, and it was just really cute and
sweet to watch. They were very attracted to her. They
always want their pictures taken with the members of the
Court. She used to do something I thought was so kind of
warm and nice: she brought her camera and wanted to take
pictures of the students. They liked that.
Finally, the opinions are filed. As most of you in
here would know, it could be several months later, but the
students and their teachers are made aware of that. We
used to actually mail them, but now they are online. We let
them know, and they discuss and read and talk about the
way they thought it was.
SCALES is not easy for the Court. It requires travel
time in addition to a lot of travel they already do. It
requires extra work for the appellate court clerk and his
staff. It requires staff, other staff. It is a lot of work.
When the Court travels for SCALES, we even take the
bench. We had a bench made. It folds up flat on piano
hinges. You would not know when it was set up that it was
not just a regular bench.
We used to joke that SCALES was sort of like a
Rolling Stones concert with all the planning and hauling
equipment, and we would say that makes the Chief Justice
the Mick Jagger. I mean, it really is sort of like that. It is a
huge production. In fact, one year we had T-shirts made
with all the dates and locations on the back that looked like
concert T-shirts. We sold those, and the proceeds went to
the Judicial Conference Foundation, which provides
scholarships for law students including the students here. I
might mention that the very first Judicial Conference
Scholarship went to a student who was inspired by
attending SCALES, so there you go.
I do not think the Court or any of the supporting
cast could have imagined, on that cold, rainy October day
in 1995 when we had the first one, how successful it would
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be. It was a less than perfect start. We had planned an
outdoor lunch-or the community had. It poured rain all
day, so very quickly churches were called into service, and
that was, you know, a problem. Then just to make matters
worse, the O.J. Simpson verdict came in, so everyone was
really distracted by that. But in spite of that, it was a
success. At least as far as the students were concerned, it
was a big success.
We will never know exactly what the payoff is. We
know the stories about students who go to law school, but
we will never know. We do know that many students have
said that they have decided on a career in law as a result,
and we believe-I believe-that all of the students will be
better informed adults and citizens because of their
participation. I for one want to thank the Court for
SCALES and the other projects to open the court system.
INTRODUCTION
MS. KELLY RANDALL: Thank you, Ms. Allison. Next,
we have Judge Richard Baumgartner, who is a judge for the
Criminal Court in Knox County, Tennessee. He has served
as Judge since 1992.
COMMENTS OF JUDGE RICHARD BAUMGARTNER
JUDGE RICHARD BAUMGARTNER: Thank you very
much. You pronounced my name exactly right. Not many
people do that. I am pleased to be here today. I want to
make one observation about these three justices and
actually all the justices in my experience with the Supreme
Court. Not only have they been very progressive in what
they do on the bench and the programs they have initiated,
but each and every one of them is very accessible to all the
members of the judiciary and, I suspect, the bar.
They all routinely attend judicial conferences that
we have every year. They participate in those programs.
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They participate in social events. They make it very
comfortable for us to be with them. I know that I
personally very much appreciate that and have talked to
other members, other colleagues, and they do also. Not
only are they progressive in their policies and decisions, but
they are very accessible to the rest of the judiciary and the
bar, and they are to be commended on that.
I took the bench in 1992. Governor McWherter had
the great sense to appoint me. Of course, in 1992 and up
until December 1995, the rules with regard to cameras in
the courtroom, public access to the courtroom other than by
print media or people drawing sketches, was extremely
restricted. Under those rules you could have cameras in the
courtroom, including T.V. cameras, but to do that you had
to write a specific written plan and submit that by way of
petition to the Supreme Court. The plan had to set out not
only why you wanted to do it but where the cameras were
going to be and great detail with regard to everything
related to having the cameras in the courtroom. It had to be
approved by the Supreme Court or at least by the justice
that was assigned to your particular district.
And of course, if it were a criminal case the accused
had to submit a written consent to being photographed, so
anytime a defendant objected that was an automatic
prohibition from continuing with that. And any lawyer,
witness, juror, or anyone else could make a complaint, and
the rule pretty much specified that you were to terminate, at
least with regard to that particular witness or lawyer, the
showing of that individual in any kind of still or video-type
of recording.
In 1995 prior to the rule change, we had a case
come up in Division I. It was styled State v. Sedalia
Freeman. Ms. Freeman killed her boyfriend, and her
defense was that she was battered by this individual. It was
really a very interesting case, and Mr. Francis, who
represented Ms. Freeman, proposed the idea-apparently
he had been approached by the Court T.V. people-that we
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televise this particular case. General Randy Nichols, who
was my predecessor on this bench, was progressive enough
and enlightened enough to agree to that.
So we approached Justice Anderson, who was the
Chief at that time but also the individual assigned to my
particular district. He was very encouraging and easy to
work with and authorized us to go forward with that.
Unfortunately, on the day of trial Ms. Freeman pled. They
offered her a deal she could not turn down. She did the
right thing; I am confident. Because it was a plea, all they
got to film was the plea itself.
But in the fall of 1995, also prior to the rule change
in December of that year, the case of State v. Frazier2°
came up. If you recall that case, it was a love triangle case
where a woman's lover was involved in attempting to kill
the husband. That was the allegation. Again, the Court
T.V. people were interested in that case, and again, we
were approached about televising it, and again, we got
approval to do that.
They came in, set up, and filmed the entire trial.
They did not play it contemporaneously; they edited it to a
certain degree and played it thirty days later or something
like that. It was my first experience with having that type
of activity in the courtroom, and it became immediately
apparent to me that all of the things that I had heard and
talked about concerning disruption and the effect on people
in the courtroom were not going to be a problem. They
were very professional. They had a single camera. They
provided the feed for local stations to use on the local news.
They were unobtrusive and very easy to deal with. So that
was our first experience, and again, Justice Anderson was
very progressive in helping us with that.
Then, of course, in December of 1995 the rule
change came into effect. The Court actually wrote an
20

State v. Frazier, No. 03C01-9602-CR-000841997, 1997 WL 294472,

at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 4, 1997).
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entirely new rule regarding cameras in the courtroom, so to
speak. They instituted a one year pilot project across the
state to see how it would play. As you can imagine, a
number of judges were immediately just shocked that we
were going to allow cameras in the courtroom, and there
was a great deal of resistance to it. As it turned out-I
think you can talk to most judges, and they will tell you
today that they have had similar experiences as mine; that it
is not obtrusive, that it is helpful in the community, and that
it does not affect the proceedings.
In effect, while going over all of the conditions or
parts of this particular rule, the rule created the presumption
that cameras would be allowed in the courtroom. They
would be allowed public access by way of print media,
photographers, and television media coverage of these
proceedings, including organizations such as Court T.V.
They put rules in place where the trial judge could limit
They set out four
that access for specific reasons.
categories of reasons that would justify keeping them from
televising it.
We had a case very soon after the rule was put in
place, which tested that. That was the case of State v.
Morrell.21 It was decided in April of 1996 by the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. In that case, a trial
judge named Robert Wedemeyer, if I remember correctly,
was in a seminar and started out by saying, "My name is
Robert Wedemeyer, and I'm a discretion abuser." He had
excluded the media from this particular case because of
high racial tensions, but the Court found that it was not a
justification for exclusion and again reiterated the fact that
there is a presumption that we are going to have cameras in
the courtroom.
My experience with it since that period of timethere have been a number of cases that were televised,
21

State v. Morrell, No. 03-C-01-9409-CR00355, 1996 WL 36120, at *1

(Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 1996).
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including State v. Huskey on three different occasions and
cases just as recently as this past week. We had a case, not
where it was national interest but where there was great
local interest, and all three of the channels were there on a
daily basis five days last week.
Again, with the local media as it is with the national
organizations, they are very courteous, they are not
disruptive, and they take any instructions very well. A
couple of times-to be candid with you, the worst-the
people that are harder to deal with than the video people are
the still photographers because for some reason they are
just-I do not know-pushier I guess you would say. They
take a thousand photographs, and you can hear every click
of that camera. I have on occasion said, "That's enough,
you've got enough pictures of the defendant," or whoever
they are taking a picture of. On occasion they will get too
close to the jury box itself. Of course, you cannot film the
jurors, and they all know that. They are good about that.
They are good about putting notice up ahead of time, so if
anybody wants to object they can.
Some of the myths about cameras in the courtroom
are that they affect the conduct of the parties and the people
in the courtroom, the lawyers included. My experience is
that people do not alter the way they testify. They are not
intimidated by the camera. They are there, and it is serious
business. They know it is serious business, and the fact
that a camera was there recording it has not, in my
experience, affected them in any way.
And lawyers do not play to the camera. If anything,
it makes otherwise sometimes disruptive lawyers behave
better because they know they are in fact on camera. It also
makes the judge act better sometimes. You have to be
careful about those embarrassing moments.
I remember one time during the Huskey trial my
mother called me, and she said, "Richard, you have got to
stop chewing gum on the bench." I said, "Mother, I am not
chewing gum." It turns out I used to have these little tins of
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hard candies; I would put one in my mouth, and I would
end up chewing them. She thought I was chewing gum.
You have got to be careful.
Just last week I went home, and my wife said, "It
looked like you were sound asleep up there on the bench
today. You know, you have a habit of sitting back, putting
your head back in the chair, and sometimes that looks like
you are going to sleep." So it causes us to think about
those things: think about what we say, think about how we
look, and think about what we are doing. I think that's
good.
As I have already said, the presence does not disrupt
courtroom proceedings. It does not delay the proceedings
in any way. I have never had that experience. It does not
affect the dignity or the decorum of the courtroom. So my
experience with cameras in the courtroom has been very
good. Not only have they covered some trials gavel to
gavel, but they have been there on numerous occasions for
motion hearings and pretrial hearings. I think it educates
the public. It lets them know what we in fact are doing
down there in the courtroom. In my judgment, the more
the public knows about what we do, the better off we're
going to be.
I have one last story I want to tell about cameras.
Of course, Justice White was one of the five members of
the Court who instituted this rule. By the way, it became
effective completely in December of 1996. But she then
had an occasion, after she came here to the law school, to
represent a defendant in my courtroom, a juvenile
defendant who was ordered to be tried as an adult.
Although she did not actually participate in the argument,
she took the position that we should exclude cameras from
the courtroom. I find it somewhat ironic that here is a
justice who institutes this policy and shows up a couple
years later taking the position that we should not allow
cameras in the courtroom.
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So that is my experience with cameras. I want to
mention one last thing, and that is all I have left. The one
thing that is not on this symposium-another very
progressive step by this Supreme Court-is that they have
completely changed the way we deal with juries in our
courtroom. Again, this was initiated by Justice Anderson
back in 1998. The Bar Association wanted to do a study
with regard to that. He was very supportive of that. He
was very supportive of sending some of us to a symposium
in New York City about changing the way we do the jury
system.
Again, they did the pilot project for a year, and then
they instituted those changes so that jurors now have the
absolute right to take notes during the trial. They have the
right to have a copy of the jury instructions. It was
amazing to me that judges did not give them a copy of the
instructions to take back in the jury room. Of course, in
criminal cases you had to always do that, but in civil cases
they did not.
They allowed them to ask questions, and everybody
said, "That just cannot work." We have been doing it for
five years now, it works like a charm, and we get great
questions and other things about the order of offered proof
and things of that nature. So that is another major
contribution, I think, that we have had from this Court, to
be progressive and bring Tennessee into the 2 1 st century.
I thank all of those gentlemen, particularly these
three, for their service on the Court. They are great jurists.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
MS. KELLY RANDALL: Thank you, Judge Baumgartner.
Now, we will take some questions from the audience if
anyone has some questions for the group here. I will start.
Judge Baumgartner, maybe you could elaborate a little bit
on the changes for the jury system.
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Well, it's
JUDGE RICHARD BAUMGARTNER:
recognition. I think Arizona was probably the state that
started most of this, and I think Massachusetts was also a
leader. But, you know, we used to bring juries in and not
tell them anything about the case, not give them any idea
what is coming. We did not let them participate in any way
in the trial itself, and we did it on our own schedule. If the
jury had to sit out in the hallway for four hours, so be it.
Well, I think what these rule changes recognized is
that, number one, we need to respect juries more; we need
to be cognizant of the fact that they should not have to sit
out there and wait for us to do our work in the courtroom.
So to the extent possible, the rules now provide that you are
to do all pretrial matters prior to the date of trial, which just
makes sense.
I think the fact that they instituted the taking of
notes, although some courts had already been doing that, is
major. I mean, again, what judge-what lawyer--does not
take notes about what is going on in the courtroom? Of
course they do. Why in the world would we ask the people
that we are calling upon to make the final decision in this
case to not take notes? It just makes sense.
Questions are another thing. It gives them the sense
that they are participating in the trial itself. It brings them
in. It makes them more a part of the case, and I think they
really appreciate that. As a matter of fact, we had them
complete questionnaires for that year's pilot project, and
they commented that they felt that made a great deal of
sense.
Another major part of it is the order of testimony.
For instance, with regard to expert proof, the courts in the
past-you had the plaintiffs case and the defendant's case
or the state's case and the defendant's case, and you might
have a mental health expert offer an opinion on the sanity
of the defendant. You hear the testimony of one of them,
and, you know, two weeks later you hear the testimony
from the other one. It just makes sense to hear all of that
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testimony at one time. So the rule now provides that you

can have that testimony back to back instead of breaking it
up between the two cases.
Also, it just makes sense that we now give jurors a
description of the case prior to voir dire. It is a basic
description of what the case is about: who the parties are,
where it took place, when it took place, and what the
defense is. These are things that they need to know, in my
judgment, to be an effective juror. We also give them
instructions at the beginning of trial with regard to the
elements of the defense and with regard to the general
principles of law that apply to the case so that they know
those rules on the front end.
Q.
I wonder if you would comment on the resistance to
jury trials now.
JUDGE RICHARD BAUMGARTNER: I am not sure I
understand you. What do you mean by "resistance"? Do
you mean from a civil standpoint or from a criminal
standpoint?
Q.
Well, I think everybody is a little-maybe this is an
exaggeration-afraid of what happens within the jury trials
from juries now. I hear from some of the insurance
attorneys that they like to go to juries because they are
getting such good decisions; juries are not giving much
money now. I think there are a lot of reasons, but
nationally, certainly, the use of juries has gone way down.
JUDGE RICHARD BAUMGARTNER: I think one of the
things that had an effect on that is alternative dispute
resolution. You fmd now that many, many more cases are
resolved through the mediation process on the civil side
rather than at a jury trial. I think that is another great
advancement that has come into play in the last ten or
twelve years.
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From a criminal standpoint, I have got a couple
prosecutors that I wish you would tell that they ought to be
afraid of going to trial. They have no fear; they try
everything. From my standpoint, I think if anything the
number of cases that we are trying in the criminal field has
certainly stayed steady and, I think, probably increased
some in the last few years. We have tried a lot of cases.
Do you think in the civil cases that maybe we are
Q.
missing something if we forget the jury trial and go so
much into mediation?
JUDGE RICHARD BAUMGARTNER: You have still got
that ultimate avenue that you can take. I think every once
in awhile it ought to be tested. I think that is true, but it
also makes a great deal of sense that, if you can resolve a
case through mediation, that is in everybody's best interest.
I was wondering if there is anything explicit in the
Q.
rule regarding cameras in the courtroom about how that
relates to the record on appeal. I could see a dispute about
the accuracy of the written transcript or maybe sanctions
that were based on the demeanor of the attorney, and I was
wondering if that affects the standards of review of rulings
if that starts becoming a legitimate part of the record.
JUDGE RICHARD BAUMGARTNER: The rule actually
explicitly provides that any recordation by that type of
organization cannot be used for any other purpose,
including appellate purposes. There are times when I wish
that was not the case. There are times when I wish I could
send this to them and show them just how these lawyers are
behaving in the courtroom. I have also had attempts by
other people to put it in the record, but the rule specifically
prohibits that, which I think is probably wise.
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Q.
Could you speak a little bit on the impact of the
media on the jury and follow that up with how the media
has affected your job dealing with lawyers?
JUDGE RICHARD BAUMGARTNER: The media and
the multiple defendant situation-I am amazed. For
instance, we had this case last week. The concern is that
because of the pretrial publicity it is going to be difficult to
get a jury. I am also amazed how easy it is to get a jury
under those circumstances. We called in a special panel
last week and called in some 200. I said to everybody in
the court, "Has anybody heard anything about this case?"
There had been an article in the paper that morning,
nothing all week until that morning. One hand went up out
of eighty-five people.
I guess my point is this: The lawyers always say
that we are going to have trouble getting a jury, but it is not
my experience. In the multiple defendant case-by the
way, it is rare that you have to try each one of those
defendants. Usually, you get a result in one case, and it is
going to foster a resolution of the other ones.
But again, I have not had any experience that
indicates that media being present in the courtroom has
affected that, and, as I said, it does not have any real impact
on me other than me trying to make sure I do not do
something embarrassing on the bench.
Q.

How about you, Mr. Bracy?

MR. LANCE BRACY: From the disciplinary enforcement
standpoint, we see no impact.
Q.

Ms. Allison?

MS. SUE ALLISON: I will reiterate what I said. It has
worked incredibly well. The media, for the most part, is
familiar with the rule. We ask the cameras-if it is a high
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profile case, you have one camera inside, and the others are
outside.
I will tell you an instance. There was a hearing in
Memphis concerning Robert Coe who was executed four
years ago, and I went over for that. Sometimes if there is a
high profile case I will help manage media. Mr. Coe kept
misbehaving and screaming things and screaming at
everybody and spitting on prosecutors. Finally, it reached
the point where the judge had to order him gagged. Some
paramedics, very humanly, gagged him, but he ate the gag.
Finally, in an effort to keep this going the judge asked,
during lunch, for a chair from a psychiatric hospital to be
brought into a jury room. When they had gotten Mr. Coe
out of the room, he asked me if I would ask the media if
they could set up monitors so Mr. Coe and his attorney
could hear it but not speak. I want you to know the T.V.
stations took their lunch hour, got their equipment, set that
up, and did it just as a courtesy.
So, I mean, there is a give and take there too, and
that was a tremendous help. It allowed the hearing to
continue, whereas it could not have without that. They are
very grateful to be able to be in the courtroom, and in
return, they bend over backwards to help out.
JUDGE RICHARD BAUMGARTNER: We did have a
funny thing happen during the Huskey murder trial. One of
the things they do in addition to filming what is going on in
the courtroom is interview people all the time. During the
course of trial, the General came in and said, "Are you
going to do something about the sheriff on T.V. telling this
whole story out there?" The tendency is to go sit in the
witness chair or interview chair and talk to the media. That
is the only thing I can think of that has ever been a little
disruptive.

40

3:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 41

Q.
Mr. Bracy, what is one of the most significant issues
that you have come across on the Board of Professional
Responsibility during your time?
MR. LANCE BRACY: I would say that the majority of
complaints have to do with lawyer-client communications.
So, through the years we have continuously talked about
that in ethics seminars. That is the significant complaint
that clients have with their lawyers, that they do not get
adequate communication. But I think that lawyers are
doing a much, much better job now due to the heightened
interest that has come about on that issue in seminars. I
mentioned the three hours of ethics and professionalism
continuing education credits, and all the sponsors of those
seminars talk about that and emphasize that. We have
come a long way in addressing that issue.
Q.

Ms. Allison, do you give out all opinions to the

various media as they are filed?
MS. SUE ALLISON: Yes.
Q.

Is there a limited list or-

MS. SUE ALLISON: It is all major media in the state, and
it is an extensive list. I also blast fax press releases to every
media in the state. My e-mail media list is pretty inclusive.
There are some small radio stations, but it is pretty allinclusive. Those are e-mailed out.
Again, when I was first hired and the job was
created-in my prior life I was a reporter, so I remember
going over on every other Monday in the morning and
picking up copies of opinions. I had to pay for them, and
when you work for UPI, which was bankrupt, I probably
did not get reimbursed. Every other Monday in the
aftemoon-that was to accommodate morning and
afternoon papers.
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So, one of the first things I asked the Court when I
got there was, "Can we give away opinions? Can we quit
charging for them?" And with no hesitation, they allowed
that. Well, when opinions started being e-mailed to me
from the clerk's office, when they started doing things
electronically, I asked the Court, "Is there any reason I
cannot e-mail these out?" No hesitation at all.
Again, it goes to their desire to make information
about the court system available and available quickly.
Within minutes after an opinion is filed I get it by e-mail,
and it is gone. It is gone out to the media, and that is a
great way to keep the public informed about what the court
system is doing.
Another thing this Court has done that some of the
Public Information Officers in other states are just
flabbergasted about-it has really worked well-is that we
learned people really, really do not understand death
penalty cases. They do not understand the process. They
get outraged because they do not understand the process.
So, on capital cases-and this was initiated although I
cannot remember which Chief was in at the time-we
started doing press releases. Any time the court does
something in a capital case, I do a press release, and it goes
out. Of course, it gets approved by the author, the person
who wrote about the incident. It has helped so much to
stop misinformation from being published about capital
cases.
Q.
You have had some district attorneys upset with the
media, have you not?
MS. SUE ALLISON: Yes, we have. We have had a push,
and it is debatable, I suppose, because the minute the
opinion is filed I send it out, and my attitude is that it is
public record; I do not care who gets it first. But we have
had some, particularly some prosecutors, who have been
upset because they want, for instance, a victim's family to
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hear what the Court decides before it is in the newspaper.
My thought on that is that they get a statement by e-mail so
pick up the phone and call. I cannot see withholding a
public record from the public because some prosecutor is
not at his desk.
JUDGE RICHARD BAUMGARTNER:
the prosecutor?

Do you send it to

MS. SUE ALLISON: No, the clerk's office.
JUDGE RICHARD BAUMGARTNER: I don't get it. I
have heard a lot of my cases-and I am not complaining
about you.
MS. SUE ALLISON: I will put you on my list.
JUDGE RICHARD BAUMGARTNER: Yeah, I mean,
you might want to include the trial judge and the prosecutor
and defense.
MS. KELLY RANDALL: I think we will take just one
more question in the back here.
Q.
Sue, what is the policy of the Court in terms of being
proactive and responding to grossly unfair criticism of the
Court by the public?
MS. SUE ALLISON: That is really frustrating as some
people in this room know. The Bar Association has a
program that they modeled after an American Bar
Association program. The problem with it and the reason it
really has not worked and we have quit asking to use it, is
the delay involved. Assume the newspaper publishes
something that needs to be responded to. If you ask the bar
to respond, it has to go through a committee. A week or so

43

3:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

44

later they're ready to respond if they agree to do so, but by
then you don't want to.
That is a real tough one. My advice-I think they
generally agree-is that, unless it's something that just
simply must be responded to, why make a two day story
out of something that is one day. Do not respond at all.
Leave it alone unless it is egregious and needs to be
responded to. That is the one unanswerable-that is
something nobody has solved, not just in Tennessee. We
discuss it among Public Information Officers. There is
nothing much you can do.
MS. KELLY RANDALL: I want to thank our speakers,
Judge Baumgartner, Sue Allison, and Lance Bracy, for
joining us today, and I am going to turn it over to Joe to get
ready for the next panel. Thank you.
INTRODUCTION
MR. JOSEPH HYDER: Our second panel is entitled
"Comparative Fault: How the Court Changed Tort Law in
Tennessee." This portion will be moderated by Dr. Otis
Stephens who is the Alumni Distinguished Service
Professor of Political Science and Resident Scholar of
Constitutional Law here at the University of Tennessee
College of Law. More importantly, we are happy to call
him one of our faculty advisors on the Tennessee Journalof
Law and Policy. Dr. Stephens, I will turn it over to you.
COMMENTS OF PROFESSOR OTIS STEPHENS
PROFESSOR OTIS STEPHENS: Thank you very much,
Mr. Hyder. I cannot resist the opportunity of making a
comment about the importance of states-and this comes
out of the political science background, I guess-the
importance of states as laboratories of experiment. What
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we have seen from that first panel is innovation led by our
State Supreme Court.
I think our United States Supreme Court should take
notice of that. There are a number of reforms that could be
instituted at that level, which I think would not interfere
with the majesty and dignity of the Court. This Court has
had the foresight to enter some of those new ideas. I notice
that the United States Supreme Court is finally recording
orally, providing an audio record, of its arguments, but we
still do not have cameras in the United States Supreme
Court, as you know.
Now, as Mr. Hyder mentioned, this panel will
discuss Tennessee's move to a comparative fault system
that occurred in 1992, and the effect that that has had on
tort law in Tennessee. The Tennessee Supreme Court, as
many of you know, adopted a comparative fault system in
McIntyre v. Balentine,22and that was a rather significant
decision, a watershed decision. We are going to hear
perspectives on that decision and its impact. As with the
previous panel, each panelist is going to be speaking for
approximately fifteen minutes followed by a fifteen minute
question and answer period.
Our first speaker is Marshall Davidson who is a
staff attorney for the Tennessee Supreme Court and also an
instructor at the Nashville School of Law where he teaches,
of all things, tort law.
COMMENTS OF MARSHALL DAVIDSON
MR. MARSHALL DAVIDSON: Before I begin, I wanted
to just note as an aside that not only did Professor White try
to mess with the cameras in that courtroom as referred to
earlier, but she also wrote the opinion for the Court that Sue
referred to where the wife was murdered in a Wal-Mart

22

McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (1992).
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parking lot and the husband showed up in the SCALES
case and cried.
PROFESSOR PENNY WHITE:
one, Marshall.

I think you wrote that

MR. MARSHALL DAVIDSON: You resolved the case in
his favor; he won. I am privileged to be a part of today's
event honoring Justices Anderson, Birch, and Drowota for
these three men have truly stamped their impression across
the full scope of Tennessee common law, and nowhere is
this more apparent than in the area of torts.
Now, as you had just mentioned, Professor, in 1992
when I suppose most of you law students were in the first
grade or thereabout, McIntyre v. Balentine was decided. I
can remember that when that decision was released a
lawyer with more than thirty years experience trying tort
cases said to me that McIntyre v. Balentine was the most
significant tort case ever decided by the Tennessee
Supreme Court.
Having been out of law school for only a couple of
years at the time, I frankly did not appreciate the full
importance of that lawyer's comment. Fast forward nearly
a decade and a half later, and I can stand here and say with
some degree of confidence that McIntyre v. Balentine is the
most significant tort case ever decided by the Tennessee
Supreme Court. This single decision has affected nearly
every facet of Tennessee tort law.
Now, at the outset, I think it is interesting to note
that McIntyre was just a typical car accident case. The
plaintiff, McIntyre, was intoxicated. He pulled out in front
of the defendant, Balentine, who was speeding, and the two
vehicles collided. The defendant's position was that even
though he was speeding the plaintiff could not recover
because the plaintiff was contributorily negligent by virtue
of his intoxication.

46

3:1

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

47

Well, the jury agreed and returned a defense verdict.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis that
comparative fault was not the law in Tennessee, and
therefore, the plaintiff was barred from recovering any
damages because of his intoxication.
Factually and
procedurally, McIntyre was about as straightforward as
they come.
But then the proverbial shoe dropped, and tort law
in this state changed from the settled and the familiar to the
uncertain and the unfamiliar. In an opinion written by
Justice Drowota, in which Justice Anderson concurredJustice Birch was to join the Court the following year-the
Court decided in McIntyre that the common law
contributory negligence rule, which had been around for
more than 150 years, was outmoded, unjust, and should be
abolished.
The rationale driving the Court's decision was,
according to the Court, basic fairness. The Court said in its
opinion, "Justice simply will not permit our continued
adherence to a rule that, in the face of a judicial
determination that others bear primary responsibility,
nevertheless completely denies injured litigants a
recompense for their damages. 23
And so with that injustice in mind, coupled with the
fact that forty-five other jurisdictions had abolished
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery, the
Court swept away that defense and in its place adopted a
system of comparative fault. Specifically, Justice Drowota
and his colleagues on the Court at the time held that, so
long as a plaintiffs fault is less than the fault of the
defendant, the plaintiff can recover damages, but those
damages would be reduced by whatever percentage of fault
was attributable to the plaintiff.
Now, here is where things get interesting, I think,
insofar as the McIntyre opinion is concerned. Justice
23

1Id. at 56.
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Drowota, Justice Anderson, and the other members of the
Court understood well that their decision would have
profound consequences on the law, and so the Court
endeavored in the opinion to provide guidance to lawyers
and litigants in court as to how the new system of handling
tort cases would interface with other legal doctrines. To
that end, the Court in McIntyre noted that comparative fault
made the doctrines of remote contributory negligence and
last clear chance obsolete.
As you know from Torts 101 with Professor King,
remote contributory negligence allows a plaintiff who is
negligent to recover damages if the plaintiffs negligence is
too far removed from the time and place or causative force
to be regarded as a cause of harm. Likewise, the doctrine
of last clear chance permits a negligent plaintiff to recover
damages provided the defendant had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the harm but negligently failed to take
advantage of that opportunity. Well, the Court in McIntyre
concluded that both of these principles were no longer
freestanding doctrines in Tennessee but instead were
factors to consider when assessing relative degrees of fault.
The Court also noted in McIntyre that because
comparative fault links liability with fault, joint and several
liability, a staple of Tennessee law, was likewise obsolete.
Further, the Court observed in McIntyre that the Uniformed
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,24 which determines
how damages are allocated among multiple tortfeasors, no
longer applied because under comparative fault each
wrongdoer would be liable only for the harm they caused.
Then, the Court in McIntyre did something that I do
not believe the Court had ever done prior to McIntyre, and I
do not believe the Court has ever done since McIntyre. The
Court wrote out, as part of its opinion, proposed jury

24

TENN. CODE ANN.

§§ 29-11-102 to -106 (1968), abrogatedby

McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 52.
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instructions and even constructed a comparative fault
verdict form.
Now, why would the Court resort to such unusual
measures? Well, it's because the Court was keenly aware
that this single decision would completely reshape the way
tort cases are analyzed in Tennessee. Indeed, Justice
Drowota believes that McIntyre is his most significant
decision in the twenty-five years that he was on the
Supreme Court. Ladies and gentlemen, he has authored
more than a thousand opinions and participated in
thousands more during his career, and he places McIntyre
at the top of the list in terms of its impact on law.
Now, to the law students among us, permit me to
suggest that you have come along in a rather fortunate time
in your legal education. The reason that I say this is
because enough time has passed since McIntyre was
decided that many of the previously undefined contours of
comparative fault have now been established. In fact,
McIntyre has been the subject of literally hundreds of
appellate cases since 1992 and for good reason I suppose.
The courts and litigants alike have had to work through the
mechanics of just how comparative fault operates under a
seemingly endless array of fact scenarios.
In the years since McIntyre was decided, the
Supreme Court has undertaken to weave comparative fault
principles into existing tort law, or where that has proven
unworkable, the Court has changed the law outright to
comport with comparative fault principles. For example,
two years after McIntyre was decided the Court was faced
with the question of whether and to what extent assumption
of risk, which had been part of English common law for
centuries, survived the adoption of comparative fault. As
you know from basic tort law, if a plaintiff was found to
have assumed the risk of harm it could not then recover for
that harm.
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Well, Justice Anderson, writing for the Court in a
case called Perez v. McConkey,25 held that assumption of
risk did not survive the adoption of comparative fault, and
with that a part of Tennessee law since 1960 was no more.
Justice Anderson believes that Perez is his most significant
comparative fault case in the sixteen years that he has been
on the Supreme Court.
The Court has had to decide whether long-standing
bodies of law like contribution, indemnity, respondeat
superior, and the family purpose doctrine survived the
adoption of comparative fault. The Court has faced issues
like whether the rescue doctrine, the sudden emergency
doctrine, the last clear chance doctrine, and the remote
contributory negligence doctrine should all be subsumed
into comparative fault law and become part of the
comparative fault mixing bowl.
Well, Justices Anderson, Drowota, and Birch have
each written or participated in decisions involving each of
these major, major issues. The Court has also had to tackle
a number of procedural type questions in the wake of
McIntyre. For example, the Court considered the following
issues:
* Whether the courts can alter the percentages of fault
assigned by a jury. The answer is no;
o Whether comparative fault applies if a wrongdoer is
protected from liability by a statute of repose. The answer
is yes;
o Whether the comparative fault joinder statute
applies in a case brought under the Governmental Tort
Liability Act or GTLA.26 Justice Birch, writing for the
Court, held that it does;
o Whether fault can be assigned to one who by statute
cannot be held liable for furnishing alcohol to a minor. The
Court has held that it cannot;
25
26

Perez v. McConkey, 872 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1994).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-20-101 to -111 (1973).
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Whether a defendant is entitled to an offset for
settlement proceeds paid to a plaintiff by other tortfeasors,
someone other than the defendant. The Court held that the
answer is no after comparative fault although the answer
was yes prior to comparative fault.
I can go on with this list, but suffice it to say that
what tort law is today in 2006, which is very different from
what it was in 1992 when McIntyre set the course for
modernizing Tennessee law, is the direct result of the work
of Justices Drowota, Anderson, and Birch. I suspect that
what tort law will be in this state decades from now will be
the direct result of the work of these three men.
Now, they did not always agree on what the law
should be. In fact, they have had their fair share of
disagreements in this regard, but there is a common thread
among these three justices: They could disagree about
what the law is or about what the law should be without
being disagreeable. May I suggest that that speaks volumes
about their integrity, about their humanity.
There is another common thread among these three
justices that I have noticed in working with them over the
years, and that is that each is motivated by a profound
desire to get it right and to make the law as clear and as
sensible as it can be made. I do not believe that as a legal
profession, as a society in general, we could ask for more
of a judge than that-to make every effort to get it right and
to ensure that the law is as clear and as sensible as possible.
Frankly, I can think of no higher compliment to their
stewardship of Tennessee's common law and no more
wonderful legacy to their successors.
Justices Anderson, Birch, and Drowota: Your sense
of justice and fair play has brought high honor to
yourselves and to the Supreme Court. From those of us
who have had the wonderful privilege of working with you
all over the years, our parting wish is that you long enjoy
the rich family lives and rewards of friends and faith that I
*
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know you so much deserve and so highly value. Thank you
for your contributions to Tennessee law.
Thank you, Mr.
PROFESSOR OTIS STEPHENS:
Davidson. Mr. Davidson's reference to history on two or
three occasions throughout his presentation reminds me of
the fact that we have a very fine history of the Tennessee
Supreme Court. 27 Just a few years ago not all states had
produced histories of their highest courts. Of course, we
have a number of histories of the United States Supreme
Court, the most recent one being approximately eleven or
twelve volumes in length and actually read by very few
people. This history of the Tennessee Supreme Court is
very well done and consists of essays by a number of
prominent historians including our own Professor Carl
Pierce, who writes on the contemporary Tennessee
Supreme Court. I know that the attorneys and judges who
are here are aware of that history, but I want our students to
be sure to take note of it. It's in our library. I think you
might want to consult that history at some point. You may
even want to look at some of the development of tort law
that is sketched within that volume. Thank you very much,
Mr. Davidson, for those excellent remarks.
INTRODUCTION
Mr. John Day is our next presenter here. He is the
founder of Branham & Day, P.C. in Nashville and also the
founder and editor of the Tennessee Tort Law Letter. Mr.
Day, we are pleased to have you with us and would like to
hear from you at this time.

27

A

HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT

(Theodore Brown,

Jr., James W. Ely, Jr., & Carl A. Pierce eds., 2002).
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COMMENTS OF JOHN DAY
MR. JOHN DAY: Good afternoon. Before I get to the
assigned topic, I have to bring to the attention of the Chief
Justice a conspiracy which I have discovered just a few
minutes ago during Sue's speaking. We need to look into
this, Judge. This is bad. Though some of you were not
here, what we learned is that a couple years ago the
Supreme Court had an oral argument involving some
chicken. What happened was that the chicken people
turned out to be providing lunch for the Court and other
people that day. This was discovered before anybody was
embarrassed. It was obviously swept under the rug by the
Administrative Office of the Courts, but I think the case
you are talking about is McCarley v. West Quality Foods.28
It is the only chicken case I can remember in the last fifteen
years. That was a very important case on two points.
Number one, it extended Byrd v. Hall,29 which was
a summary judgment case and talked about the burden of
the movant for summary judgment. The second part of that
case, the chicken part-or should I say McNugget-has to
do with making it possible for somebody to actually win a
food poisoning case. It was impossible before, but it's now
possible. Somebody leaked a straw poll vote on that case,
and the chicken people tried to poison the Tennessee
Supreme Court. You saved their lives by cutting the
chicken off at the pass.
The case we are here to talk about today, McIntyre,
as well as its predecessor, Street v. Calvert,30 remind me of
the words of Justice Wanamaker from 1919 who said, "A
decided case is worth as much as it weighs in reason and
McCarley v. West Quality Foods Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn.
1998).
29 Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993).
30 Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d 576 (Tenn. 1976), abrogated by
28

McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 52.
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righteousness and no more." 31 There is a lot of law out
there, and some of it is bad. The fact that it happens to be
printed in books and put on shelves in libraries does not
mean it's right.
What this Supreme Court did in McIntyre was look
at Street v. Calvert and all the cases that it cited and said,
"This is not right. This is not righteous. This is no longer
reasonable, and we are going to fix it. We have invited the
legislature to do it. They have refused, and we are going to
fix it on our own." What they did with one sweep of the
pen that May 4, 1992 has truly changed the landscape of
tort law that will affect all of us and our children to the
extent that we are ever involved in tort law, tort litigation,
or any sort of incident ourselves. There were lots and lots
of cases that followed. I am not going to discuss each one
of those. I am going to discuss on a broader scale what the
adoption of comparative fault has meant to plaintiffs and to
plaintiffs' lawyers.
First of all, the adoption of comparative fault has
made it easier to settle cases. It used to be that there was
always a risk of zero if your client was found at fault in
some shape, form, or fashion. Now, that risk is less. There
is still a risk of zero verdicts--do not get me wrong-but
the risk of a zero is reduced. Therefore, it is easier to try a
case; it makes you less afraid to try a case, and it, therefore,
makes it easier to settle a case. It is difficult to tell what
effect that has had on the number of settlements because of
the advance of alternative dispute resolution during the
same time period. We are not dealing with the same set of
variables, but I feel reasonable people will say that it has
made it easier to resolve cases because the risk of a zero is
reduced. It has still not tilted the scales too far in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant because cases still
get zeroed out. You can still lose a case, so it makes things
fair as it were.
31 Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, 126 N.E. 300, 352 (1919).
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The creation of nonparty liability and the abolition
of joint and several liability has been sort of a mixed
blessing for the plaintiff, and I almost hate to say that out
loud because publicly it is my position that joint and
several liability should be the law. One advantage to a
plaintiff having several liability is a shift in the strategy
among defendants.
You see, it used to be that defendants would come
into court with their gray suits on arm in arm singing
Kumbaya because they had decided that at the end of the
day-Andy, you know, you have that gray suit on-at the
end of the day they would all go down together. They
knew that picking on one another would not do anybody
any good, so they had this unholy alliance. Every once in
awhile somebody would break out of the cartel in closing
argument and point the finger at somebody else, and that
would be remembered.
Really, in the ordinary course there was a deal cut
that they were going to go down together or win together,
and that's the way it worked. That is no more with several
liability. Now, with several liability there is an economic
advantage for people to point the finger at one another, so
what you see with the skilled plaintiffs' lawyers is an effort
to make defendants point the finger at one another early
and hard.
There are all sorts of ways you can achieve this:
through the timing of settlements, through the timing of
scheduling orders, or by cutting off motions to amend to
add fault against coparties or nonparties. There are all sorts
of things you can do to cause one defendant to point a
finger at another defendant and, therefore, enhance if not
justice than certainly the result in the case. So the abolition
of joint and several liability, the replacement of it with
several liability, and the presence of nonparty liability have
changed the way we litigate cases today.
On the other hand, the abolition of joint and several
liability has wreaked havoc with other types of cases. Let
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me say this: In an abstract world one could argue that joint
and several liability should not exist. In a perfect world
where people are truly responsible for their actions, it
works every time. It has some sort of intellectual appeal
that I am only responsible for what I do.
The problem with that approach is that the
legislature doesn't see it this way. The legislature grants
certain privileges to money interests, and the legislature
grants immunities to people just because the have more
lobbyists than somebody else. The legislature puts damage
caps on wrongful conduct by the government because it
can. The legislature says that because of the mere passage
of time a manufacturer of a product or a careless doctor at a
hospital should get off the hook because they have not been
caught quickly enough.
These immunities, those special privileges, and
those damage caps alter a world where people are supposed
to be responsible for what they do, and instead, create a
world where people are only responsible if they don't have
a lobbyist. So the problem with the abolition of joint and
several liability and some of the Court's decisions in that
regard, is that they are going to fall on the plaintiff. Justice
Anderson and I agree that that's wrong, but he's got one
vote. I don't have any.
I say that negative thing, in a way, only to point out
the pros and cons of the abolition from the standpoint of the
plaintiff not to take away from the decision itself. It was a
wonderful progression in the law to have this opinion
released at 8:03 a.m. on May 4, 1992. It was a wonderful
thing. It was the way it should have been. It was done the
way it had to be done under all of the circumstances. I can
tell you that it would never have passed the legislature.
I participated in the negotiations with the business
and insurance industry. We could not get this done. It
would have never happened any other way. It took the
courage of the Supreme Court to make it happen. While I
from time to time express some problem with the result, I
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have to say-in fact, it is easy for me to say-that we are
so much better off as a society with this case than we were
without it, and I look forward to the opportunity to tweak it
in the future.
In fact, I told Justice Drowota during lunch that we
had filed a Notice of Appeal to McIntyre. I believe that
pure comparative fault should be adopted. I understand
why it was not adopted at the time. I am not being critical
when I say that, but I believe that should be the law. We
now have the case. It has been filed. It seems to me that,
in the words of McIntyre, liability should be imposed only
proportionate to fault. If a 50% at fault defendant does not
bear 100% of the financial responsibility for a loss, why
should a 50% at fault plaintiff bear 100% of the financial
responsibility for a loss? What is good for the goose is
good for the gander.
So I hope, sir, to reverse you, but I hope you think
that you could be reversed too. I say that for this reason:
The law is a living organism. It is not supposed to be cast
in concrete. It needs to be changed, and we are now, as we
were, at a point where we can do this. We are at a point
where we can take the next step.
Now, let me comment for a couple of minutes about
what else has happened in tort law. Before 1990-1 think
it's fair to say-the Court was wedged to the past, and I say
that not in a way of challenging or questioning the intellect
or the integrity of the people who served then because
Justice Drowota was on the Court before 1990. I am
talking about the mindset of the Court before 1990
compared to the mindset of the Court after 1990. I am
talking about August of 1990. There was a shift, and
anybody watching could see there was a shift in the
mindset: "We're going to look forward not back."
Justice Henry said in 1975, "The common law does
not have the force of a Holy writ; It is not a last will and
testament, nor is it a cadaver embalmed in perpetuity, nor is
it to be treated like the sin of Judah-'written with a pen of
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iron and with the point of a diamond.' ' 32 The Supreme
Court that took office in August of 1990 took those words
to heart and started fixing what needed to be fixed. Let me
hit some highlights.
* McClenahan v. Cooley33 was Justice Drowota's case
holding that a person who negligently leaves their keys in
the car in violation of the law can be held liable for a wreck
twenty minutes later when that car is stolen by a thief. This

is a critical case in the law of duty and probable cause that
will live in the history of this state forever;
* Haynes v. Hamilton County34 held that the police
can chase a wrongdoer, but they are going to be responsible
for the harm they cause if they recklessly chase another;
0 Camper v. Minor35 held that an injured mind is
worth as much and has as much right to be heard by a jury
as an injured leg. What a progressive opinion for the courts
of this state;
* Jackson v. General Motors36 brought our products
liability law into the 20 th century;
e

McDaniel v. CSX Transportation37 is the expert

witness case. Judges should be gatekeepers of expert
testimony, not storm troopers. We adopted a gatekeeper
not a storm trooper approach;
* Myint v. Allstate38 was your opinion, Justice Birch.
Insurance companies are responsible for their insureds.
They are consumers, and the Consumer Protection Act 3 9 is
available to them. There should not be any question about

32

Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 688 (Tenn. 1975) citing Jeremiah

17:1 (King James).

33 McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 76 (Tenn. 1991).
34 Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606 (Tenn. 1994).
35 Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1996).
36

Jackson v. General Motors Corp., 60 S.W.2d (Tenn. 2001).

37 McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997).
38

Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920 (Tenn. 1998).
§§ 47-18-101 to -128 (1977).

39 TENN. CODE ANN.
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it. It was contested before the Supreme Court heard about
it;
* McClung v. Delta Square4 ° held that if you invite
people onto your property, you have a duty to make that
property reasonably safe from foreseeable criminal
activities. Roger McClung, who lost his wife there, fought
the courts for ten years. This Court, these peopleauthorized by you-did the right thing by Roger McClung;
* Before Jordan v. Baptist Three Rivers Hospital"
the life of a wife, mother, nonworking husband, or elderly
person was measured by the stone cold abacus not as the
value of a human being. This Court recognized that that
loss, the loss of a mother, is something that should be
compensated by a jury;
0 One of the best cases and one that this Supreme
Court should be the most proud of is Mercer v.
Vanderbilt.42 Why? Because this Court reversed itself
after just eight years. Gray v. FordMotor Company4 3 was
dead wrong. It was wrong, and there are two ways you can
handle something that's wrong. You can write it off as
stare decisis, or you can fix it. Listen to what Justice
Jackson said in Massachusetts v. United States: "I see no
reason why I should be consciously wrong today because I
was unconsciously wrong yesterday."" The Court realized
that they were unconsciously wrong in 1996, and in 2004
they fixed it. What tremendous courage. What tremendous
courage;
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McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P'ship, 937 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn. 1996).
v. Baptist Three Rivers Hosp., 984 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1999).
42 Mercer v. Vanderbilt Univ., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 121 (Tenn. 2004).
43 Gray v. Ford Motor Co., 914 S.W.2d 464 (Tenn. 1996), overruled
by
Mercer, 134 S.W.2d at 121.
44 Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 639-40 (1948)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
41 Jordan
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* Finally, there's Doe v. Roman Catholic Church.45
That was my case. What you do not know because
obviously I would never tell you this before today is that I
turned that case down-those children who were sexually
abused by a former priest of the church. I turned that case
down for two reasons. First of all, I assumed that a church
would not do what these kids told me they had done.
Second, there was not a hole; there was not a pigeon hole in
which to put that case.
I am pretty familiar with the law, and I knew that
the law of outrageous conduct was not quite there yet.
Well, then I learned some more facts about the case. I
figured out that the church did what they did, but I still had
a problem with the law. I took that case to help those kids
because I knew that this Court would not be mired down in
old pigeon holes but would look to create a new one, and
that is exactly what they did. It cost me $130,000 and over
3,000 hours, but this Court made new law for the nation
with that one case and gave these boys the opportunity to
go in front of a jury who would hold two bishops
accountable for what they did.
The common theme running through all these cases
is that this Court trusts people to make decisions. Concepts
of duty and proximate cause are like circles, and those
circles are bigger or smaller depending on the philosophy
of the people who are drawing them. People who tend not
to trust juries make the circle small. People who trust the
wisdom of a jury make the circle bigger. This Court
recognized that the circle should be bigger because the
people on juries knew how to handle the responsibility that
they were given.
The fact of the matter is that poor people and weak
people and powerless people don't have any voice in the
legislature. There is no "Future Wrongful Death Victims of
Doe 1 ex rel. Doe I v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, 154
S.W.2d 22 (Tenn. 2005).
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60

3:1 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 61

America" lobby. There are twenty-three million members.
We're all a part of it. We have no path. We have no
executive director. We don't meet at the Greenbrier for
meetings. But we do have the enlightened wisdom of
judges that help us get justice.
So on behalf of my clients, I want to thank each of
you for what you have done for real people during your
term. You should be proud of what you have done.
INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR OTIS STEPHENS: Thank you very much,
Mr. Day, for your very interesting and informative
comments. Our final speaker is Andrew Tillman. Andrew
Tillman is a partner with Paine, Tarwater, Bickers &
Tillman right here in Knoxville. He specializes in tort
defense litigation. Mr. Tillman, we will hear from you
now.
COMMENTS OF ANDREW TILLMAN
MR. ANDREW TILLMAN: I am honored but a little
intimidated by all these fine speakers. Mr. Day here has
been talking about my clients and my clothes. I knew I was
chosen to be on this program because my senior partner
was not going to be available, but some of these things kind
of took me by surprise. I thought this was a roast. I did not
know I was supposed to say good things about these
justices.
Anyway, to understand my perspective of what
McIntyre has done you have to understand where I was
when McIntyre came along. I had an amount of gray hair,
but they did not turn gray from lawyering. I went back to
law school after I got too old to do anything really
constructive, and I got out of law school in 1989. I worked
two years as a federal clerk, so that put me walking into
private practice on the day after Labor Day in 1991. So in
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September of 1991 1 started practicing law. Then in May
of 1992 along comes McIntyre. I am at the very bottom of
the letterhead at that point in time, and we know that some
things roll downhill.
When we first read McIntyre we were primarily
defending product liability claims. We had been held
jointly and severally liable under the circumstances. The
first reading says we're going to be evenly responsible for
our fault. That sounded pretty good to us. And so within
about a week all these questions arose, and the Court said
in McIntyre that we would have to wait for an answer
another day. What happens here? Should we amend our
answer? Can we plead this person's fault? There was just a
tremendous pile of questions. So, being the great legal
scholar that I was, I ran.
Judge Tony Phillips had agreed to take the federal
bench. He was the County Attorney from Scott County, so
I got on the ballot in Scott County to be the County
Attorney. The people of Scott County decided to make a
great sacrifice, and they sent me back to Knoxville to
practice law. When I got back my desk was piled just as
full as it ever was with all these unanswered questions, so I
organized those questions in groups that I will address here
today as to how McIntyre changed the practice of law from
a defense perspective. Really there are just three areas of
law that McIntyre affected as far as I can tell: pleadings,
motions, and trials.
Well, how did McIntyre affect the pleadings part of
the law? Well, for one thing Rule 11 is pretty wide open.
You can allege about anything you want after McIntyre as
far as other responsible persons, but the question comes up,
"Well, what happens?" It usually comes down to this: "I
don't know who this person is. I don't know where they
work. This car ran me off the road. I don't know who they
are. Why can't we plead them? Will we only be
responsible for our fault?" You get those kinds of
questions. Well, the Court only took eight years to answer
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that one for me. It was Brown v. Wal-Mart46 in 2000 as far
as I can tell.
Then you have those cases where you'd rather not.
You get this great answer, and you raise all these
affirmative defenses about all these other tortfeasors. Then
the partner says, "That's his brother, his kin folk, that
you're alleging is at fault here," or he says, "That person is
probably insured by the same insurance company that hired
us. How many more times do you think we're going to get
hired if you get them sued?" Or maybe you've got a
situation where this person you maybe need to allege fault
against is a witness. Perhaps it's a medical malpractice
case, and they're a witness, a treating doctor, and you want
some favorable testimony. Good luck if you allege
comparative fault. These are the kind of questions we have
to deal with from the defense side. So along comes George
v. Alexander,47 and we know what we've got to allege. We
know that we've got to put some specificity in there, who
they are and what they did.
There is a related question you may get. A new
defendant is brought in, and a partner comes to you and
asks, "Can they bring me in after the statute of
limitations?" You have the Lipscomb case.48 The plaintiff
knew about my guy all long, so why did he wait until now
to sue him? So you get those kinds of things. By the way,
I had a corollary to the Lipscomb case long before
Lipscomb down in Cookeville with Judge Maddux, and I
believe he reached the right decision there consistent with
Lipscomb to let me out. Those are the primary pleading
issues that I want to mention.
I see two distinct changes in motion practice from
the defense perspective. There are Barney motions, the
nip-it-in-the-bud motions. I would say that there have been
46 Brown v. Wal-Mart Discount Cities, 12 S.W.3d 785 (Tenn. 2000).
47 George v. Alexander, 931 S.W.2d 517 (Tenn. 1996).
48
Lipscomb v. Doe, 32 S.W.3d 840 (Tenn. 2000).
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more motions to strike filed in the five or ten years after
McIntyre than were ever filed in the history of the State of
Tennessee. Well, what type of motions to strike? They did
not plead it with specificity, so they cannot shift fault over
to us. The trial court would tell them, now, that they don't
get to use this as an affirmative defense. Well, this is a
strict liability case. That never was a defense before, back
in the old days, so why should it be now?
I do not know how many cases were raised on
motions to strike, but I am sure some of the cases came to
this Court on motions to strike-came up the ladder
somehow on a motion to strike an affirmative defense. Not
all the cases can take that format, where the defendant files
an answer that lays the affirmative defense and the plaintiff
says, "I do not want them to raise that affirmative defense.
They should not be able to." That is a distinct change, I
believe, in defense practice when we are posing the Barney
motions.
I think maybe the primary change in motions
practice is on motions for summary judgment.
Occasionally, the plaintiffs lawyer will not be as capable as
Mr. Day over here and will not do the best job of defending
a motion for summary judgment or opposing a motion for
summary judgment filed by a codefendant. So the question
comes to us from the defense prospective: Do we jump in
and play tag team with the plaintiffs lawyer?
You say, "Why would you ever want to do that?
Why would you do that?" Well, one of these days you
might be trying this case. One of these days you're going
to be deciding who goes on the verdict form, and one of
these days the trial judge might say to you, "Look, we have
already determined as a matter of law that this particular
defendant has no fault." I, as a codefendant, might not
want that. I might want that person on the verdict form. So
that is sort of a dilemma for us. It kind of hampers the
ability to sing Kumbaya and go arm and arm with the other
guys. So why not go ahead and do it? There is an old
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saying that people who live in glass houses should not
throw stones. They might throw stones back at us. That
might be one reason.
I will say that Mr. Day hit the nail on the head there
in a sense. After all, somebody has got to pay the bill for
all these actions and pleadings and all this follow up that
we have. There is a matter of showing your hand
sometimes too with experts and that sort of thing.
Sometimes you've got to use a motion for summary
judgment to flush something out of the bushes. If
everybody starts jumping in the ring, everybody knows
everything early on.
As to the trial aspects of McIntyre, I think probably
one of the most dreaded things is to have a serious case and
go before the jury with every defendant or every possible
defendant or potential defendant pointing the finger at the
other. There is a distinct idea that the jury is going to lose
its reluctance to say, "This is just a plaintiff making a big
thing out of nothing," and award a very, very nice verdict
in the case.
I had a note about peremptory strikes. All the
commentators seem to think that many defendants want as
many strikes as they can get. It has been my experience
picking a jury that with only six peremptory strikes there is
not much to go around when you have a lot of parties, and I
have had tal courts that would not let us even talk to each
other about who is going to get struck. So potentially, with
six defendants there they can strike the same juror, and
those are their strikes; knock one juror off the panel.
Every issue that I have mentioned may also be a
jury instruction issue, whether they go on the verdict form
and that so forth issue. If a motion to strike is not filed and
the issue lives, the question is whether the issue may go on
the verdict form. Rather than talk about all of these issues
again, I thought I would mention three that appear to me to
be appropriate instruction type issues that might come
before the Court in another way.
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Should the jury be instructed that the plaintiffs acts
can be a superseding and intervening cause in comparative
fault and that if that plaintiff is 50% at fault that plaintiff
goes home with nothing?
So why do you need a
superseding and intervening cause anyway? That is a
potential jury instruction issue, and I think that it's
illustrative of the things that we have sort of struggled with
from the defense perspective.
In a crash-worthiness case tried as a comparative
fault case on the issue of injury, do you instruct the jury
that they can deduct any injury that the plaintiff would have
sustained with a safe product, or is that double dipping?
That was talked about in Whitehead v. Toyota,49 but I don't
understand it. I don't understand what you deduct and
what you do not. I think there is still a jury instruction
issue in there. What if a good doctor might have prevented
the injury; then might a good product have reduced the
injury?
I will make just a couple of comments of what I
could have done better with the McIntyre case. I could
have started a comparative tort newsletter like Mr. Day
over here, and I could have embraced the uncertainty.
Even though they have labeled me a defense lawyer, I have
been on both sides of the issue. I think there is a cost to
plaintiffs in uncertainty. Recently, I was involved in a
fairly significant plaintiffs case that cost hundreds of
thousands of dollars to get to a jury. We got a good
verdict, but there were lots of issues that we had to just
punt because while we might have gotten a better verdict
who could afford to try this case twice? Who could afford
to go to the jury twice? You do the best trial you can and
eliminate as many of the issues as you can. I never realized
until that case how much the uncertainty might work in the
defendant's favor. So I guess if I were to criticize myself, I

49

Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 S.W.2d. 684 (Tenn. 1995).
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need to embrace any uncertainty raised in McIntyre more.

Thank you all. Thank you.
INTRODUCTION
MR. JOSEPH HYDER: In the second portion, we have
invited former and current law clerks for the justices that
we are honoring today to give us a brief tribute about what
they are like to work for.
First, we will have Rodd Barckhoff.
Rodd
Barckhoff has served as a law clerk to Justice Anderson
since 1996. He also serves as an adjunct professor of law
here at the University of Tennessee College of Law.
Professor Barckhoff:
COMMENTS OF PROFESSOR RODD BARCKHOFF
PROFESSOR RODD BARCKHOFF:
If any of my
students happen to be here-they had oral arguments on
Wednesday of this week-I would like to reserve two
minutes for rebuttal. Particularly since Justice Anderson is
going to be speaking next, and as modest as he is, I may
need that rebuttal.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to pay
this tribute to Justice Anderson of the Tennessee Supreme
Court. I have had the honor of working for Justice
Anderson for almost ten years. I feel like it has been like
having a front row seat to watch a great Court and truly
remarkable justices engage in the pursuit of justice. Justice
Anderson, Justice Birch, and Justice Drowota, as we have
heard in the first two hours, have been towering figures in
Tennessee law. I think in their combined fifty years of
experience on the Supreme Court they have had an impact
that has been matched or rivaled by very few judges or
lawyers. Just as important, I think they have all been
visible role models in demonstrating the commitment to the
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administration of justice that we should all have as judges

or lawyers.
Justice Anderson was appointed to the Tennessee

Court of Appeals in 1987 after he had practiced law in Oak
Ridge for almost thirty years. He was first elected to the
Supreme Court in 1990, and he was reelected to the Court
in 1998. His tenure as a Supreme Court Justice has been
marked by his wisdom, his guidance, and his compassion.
As you know, the cases that come before the Court
are often extraordinarily difficult cases:
capital
punishment, comparative fault which we have heard so
much about, discrimination, professional malpractice, land
use, elections, and term limits to name just a few. These
issues come up in cases that likely have very heated or
emotional backdrops. There are very few easy decisions.
There are even fewer routine matters.
In the face of these challenges Justice Anderson's
temperament and demeanor have remained calm, assured,
and experienced. It has truly been remarkable. He is
motivated only by his desire to find an answer that is right
and a result that is just. He has a judge's knowledge of the
law, and he still retains a lawyer's feel for the practical
effects of a decision.
Just recently, I was working on what I thought was
a very complex medical malpractice case, and as longtime
judicial clerks do I was combing the rules and reading cases
from other states and jumping on Westlaw and all that. I
started to talk to Justice Anderson about it, and he said,
"The first mistake here is suing the nurses. You never sue
the nurses. You need to have them on your side." I
thought, "Those are the words of somebody who has
remained a trial lawyer at heart after all this time."
In sixteen years on the Supreme Court, Justice
Anderson has served four terms as Chief Justice, more
terms than any other Chief Justice in the history of the
Court. His service as Chief Justice has been marked by his
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vision, his leadership, and the Court's contributions to the
administration of justice.
Under Justice Anderson's leadership, the Court
increased the efficiency of the judicial system through
alternative dispute resolution, automation, and increased
technology. There is some irony here because those of us
who have worked for Justice Anderson on his staff have
often witnessed his encounters with faulty cell phones,
stubborn computers, and broken fax machines that have no
paper. All of this usually led to his pleas for help from
longtime administrative assistant, Debbie Harmon.
Under Justice Anderson's leadership that we have
heard so much about, the Court made a priority of
visibility. The Court fostered education and awareness of
the system by adopting and allowing cameras in the
courtroom. The Court also implemented the SCALES
program, which provided thousands of students with a firsthand look at the role of courts, the role of judges, the role
of lawyers, and the deliberate and careful manner in which
disputes are resolved.
In an age where perceptions of the judicial system
are often negative and too often fueled by the sensational,
Justice Anderson believes that solutions are found through
more visibility, not less, and by opening doors, not building
walls. He has put a human face to the Court: traveling to
over ninety counties in his time, educating the public about
the role of an independent judiciary, discussing the
workings or the failings of the judicial system, and always
searching for the new and the better to replace the old or
the ineffective.
As important as these tangible contributions have
been, my lasting impression of Justice Anderson will
always be his concern about the cases that do not make it
before the Court or do not make it before any court because
the individuals may not have had access to counsel. Justice
Anderson has rarely said "no" when asked to speak to
students, bar organizations, or civic organizations, and his
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remarks always emphasize the importance of pro bono
service and the need to provide a voice to those who have
none.
He has provided a strong, visible reminder that
justice is attained only if the courts are open to all without
regard to income, race, ethnicity, or social status. He often
quotes the words of Justice John Marshall Harlan, which I
am going to do here: "But in the view of the constitution,
in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here.
Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights,
all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the
peer of the most powerful. 5 ° Justice Anderson has worked
to embody these words.
Although he has certainly earned his retirement, he
will be greatly missed and not just by those of us who have
to find new jobs. He has earned the time to rest although I
doubt his grandchildren will let him. He has earned the
time to travel, to read, to study history, and most
importantly, to work on his golf swing. I am truly
privileged to have had my front row seat for ten years, and
we are grateful to have had Justice Anderson's service as a
member of the Court. Thank you for this opportunity.
COMMENTS OF JUSTICE E. RILEY ANDERSON
Members of the
JUSTICE E. RILEY ANDERSON:
faculty especially Professor White and Professor Stephens,
members of the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy,
fellow judges, and ladies and gentlemen: Rodd, thank you
for that overly generous introduction. I am honored and
humbled to be a part of this symposium. I had some great
teachers at this law school, and I am not sure they would

50 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 558 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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have ever predicted that the word "legacy" would be
associated with my work.
I am particularly pleased that this symposium has
focused on some of the issues that have been most
important to me during my time on the Court and during
my terms as Chief Justice. I hope that I have contributed in
some way to the legacy of openness and accessibility to the
judicial system.
In the literature and some of the speaking here, I
have been given credit for SCALES and Cameras in the
Courtroom, but I want to emphasize that the whole Court
was responsible for and enthusiastic about both of those
projects. It was not a one-person thing. It was a whole
court approach to both of those progressive things.
All of the studies of the last three decades have
concluded that the Court is the least understood and most
often misportrayed branch of government, and yet it is the
only branch of government which the Constitution requires
to do its business in public and which allows the public as
jurors to be a part of its decision-making process.
One of the ways-and we did try to make the
judiciary more open during my time-is through the
adoption of Cameras in the Courtroom. Ten years after we
adopted Rule

3051

and piloted the Cameras

in the

Courtroom rule, I continue to believe that live coverage of
actual court proceedings is vital to citizens' understanding
and accountability of the justice system. It's the sit-upstraight factor that Richard Baumgartner referred to. It is in
the best interest of the public to be fully and accurately
informed about the system, and I think the last ten years has
shown that this interest can be compatible with the fair
administration of justice. I think it has provided the public
with an invaluable opportunity to observe and understand
the judicial process.

51 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 30.
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It was originally and still is my hope that courts
would be covered daily by cable on a gavel to gavel basis
as much as city council and county governments are
covered now, and we made some efforts along that line.
They were not completely successful. I hope to avoid the
sound byte coverage which tends to misportray the issues
in trial. We have had partial success with cable television
in Middle Tennessee in some well-publicized trials which
have had gavel to gavel coverage and commentary, and
hopefully that coverage will continue.
In the courtroom of the real world as opposed to
that of television and movies, the viewing public has not
found ultra-polished lawyers and judges. They are only
human beings like the rest of us; they search for words, lose
their place, and sometimes become confused. And instead
of the fast pace of L.A. Law, they see a mostly slowmoving process with low-key, complex rules and
arguments that focus on procedures which protect rights.
Cameras in the Courtroom has enhanced the public's
awareness of the judicial system as a human one, dedicated
to preserving and protecting individual rights for a fair trial
and at the same time preserving and protecting the rights of
society.
A federal court camera experiment, which was also
very successful, was not adopted by the Federal Judicial
Conference headed by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist. I
think that was a major mistake. In an environment of
hostility to the independence of the courts by irresponsible
members of Congress, cable T.V. commentators, and
others, it is particularly important that the public have the
opportunity to view the courts as they actually are.
Another avenue for broadening the accessibility of
the courts is to bring the courts to the people. The
SCALES program strives to do this. I believe SCALES is
one of the things I am most proud to have been a part of
during my time on the Court. In its twelve years the
SCALES program has reached thousands of students,
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giving them a front row seat to the judicial process. The
goal of SCALES, like Cameras in the Courtroom, is to
demystify the courtroom and give students an
understanding of how real lawyers handle real cases.
You have been told about the impact since its
inception. In reaching over 15,000 students in thirty-five
counties, 337 schools have been involved. The courtroom
is not sacrosanct. It belongs to the people just as any other
part of government does. The mystique that surrounds the
judicial process is under revision. Televising judicial
proceedings and inviting students to observe and be a part
of a special program provides for greater opportunity for
public scrutiny and allows citizens to judge for themselves
whether the courts are functioning well.
As to the last topic in today's symposium,
comparative fault, all I can say about that is that it is just
one example of the many, many fascinating issues that have
been my pleasure and privilege to work with during my
time on the Court.
On a personal note, I have loved the law both as a
trial lawyer and as a judge. I have looked forward to
coming to work each and every day that I have been on the
Supreme Court, and every day has been different and
enjoyable. I have had excellent law clerks that worked for
me on the Supreme Court. Rodd Barckhoff, who has
worked for me for ten years, is an example of the best of
the best. Lisa Rippy, who worked for me before Rodd for
four years, was outstanding. Although Kathy Shirk has
been with us only two years, she is very talented and
following in their footsteps. Aside from their stellar work,
it has been a pleasure to get to know them personally and to
follow their successes. I am proud that first Lisa and now
Rodd will become members of the Supreme Court central
staff.
I have had the great fortune of having Debbie
Harmon as my executive secretary for almost twenty years.
She does a fabulous job, and that makes me look far better
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than I am. And as Rodd pointed out, she helps me with
technology occasionally. I have also had the opportunity to
be associated with talented and very intelligent members of
the Court. Chief Justice Barker and Justice Clark are two
of those that are present, and two other Justices, Frank
Drowota and Al Birch, not only did exceptional work on
the Supreme Court but were a pleasure to work with. We
became close friends. I will miss them all. Thank you.
INTRODUCTION
MR. JOSEPH HYDER: Our next speaker, who will be
doing the tribute to Justice Birch, will be Raney Irwin. Ms.
Irwin is the Assistant General Counsel for the Tennessee
Department of Health, and she served as Justice Birch's law
clerk in 2002.
COMMENTS OF RANEY IRWIN
MS. RANEY IRWIN: Good afternoon. I am a 2002
graduate of this prestigious University, and I am glad to be
back to speak at this symposium. Almost everyone knows
of Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr. and his many
accomplishments in the field of law. Almost everyone
knows of Justice Birch and his undying commitment for
equal treatment during the civil rights movement. Almost
everyone knows of Justice Birch, the pioneer who helped
pave the road for African Americans in Tennessee who
wanted to become lawyers and judges and anything else
that they wanted to be in the legal arena.
When you mention his name you may hear people
say that he was the first African American to do this and
the first African American to do that, and for the most part
they are correct. Justice Birch was the first African
American to serve as General Sessions Court Judge in
Nashville, Tennessee. He was the first African American
to serve as Criminal Court Judge in Nashville as well. He
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was also the first African American to serve on the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals and then later to be
elected to the Tennessee Supreme Court. In 1996, he was
the first African American Chief Justice to serve on the
Supreme Court.
While many know of Justice Birch and his many
first accomplishments, few people know him from the
perspective of his judicial law clerks. Few people know
him as Justice Birch the teacher, the mentor, the friend. As
a former clerk for Justice Birch, I was honored that the
members of the Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy
invited me to speak to this audience, to give some insight
on Adolpho A. Birch, Jr., so I will relate to you some of my
personal experiences with Justice Birch the teacher, the
mentor, the friend.
My first experience with Justice Birch was during
the interview phase for the position of the clerkship. I was
excited to say the least when I learned I had been granted
an opportunity to interview with him for a clerkship on the
Tennessee Supreme Court, but I must say that I was quite
surprised when I received a phone call from one of his
clerks informing me that I should pack a lunch for the
interview. This seemed a bit unorthodox, and I did not take
it seriously. In my mind the interview would not take
longer than one to one and a half hours, and I would just
grab a bite to eat on the drive back to school. After all, my
interview time was set for eight o'clock in the morning.
I arrived a few minutes early and was surprised to
learn that the Judge was already there and waiting to start
the interview. I was escorted into his office where he spoke
with me for about fifteen minutes or so. At the conclusion
of that time, the Judge thanked me for taking the time to
drive to Nashville to meet him, and he informed me that he
would be in touch. He then directed me to his assistant's
office, and I left. I thought, "Whoa, that was easy." I
thought I was going to be nervous, sweating profusely,
hands clammy.
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I walked into his assistant's office, and she directed
me down a hall to a tiny room where there was a desk, a
computer, nine or ten Westlaw cases, and a paragraph long
question. She sat me down at the computer, and she
instructed me to read the question and the cases and write
an opinion on which side should win and why. She
informed me that I had until the close of business that day
to submit my answer. Now I was nervous. Now I was
sweating profusely.
After about six gut wrenching hours, I submitted
my final draft opinion. All the way home back to
Knoxville I pondered over whether I answered the question
correctly and what would happen if I had not answered
correctly. I later learned that my answer had come down
on the side of the dissenting opinion, but Justice Birch
hired me anyway. He explained to me that it was not as
important for me to get the answer right as it was to come
up with a sound, concise, and logical analysis of the law.
He explained to me that that's what makes an excellent
lawyer.
I learned early on in my clerkship that having
Justice Birch for a mentor would be challenging to say the
least. Imagine arriving to your fourth grade English class
on the first day of school only to find out that your father is
teaching the class. Imagine arriving to the first day of
basketball tryouts only to find out that your father is the
new head coach. Imagine going to Sunday school only to
find out that Deacon Smith is ill, and your father is going to
substitute the class. That's what having Justice Birch for a
mentor was like; learning was a daily experience.
Justice Birch was a stickler for grammar, word
choice, and usage. In law school we learn to carry around
our Bluebook like it's our Bible. We never left home
without it, and when in doubt we always consulted with it
before putting pen to paper. Well, in the Judge's office we
used the Bluebook and the Redbook, a book I never knew
existed. But there is a Redbook, and Justice Birch made
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sure all of his clerks knew how to use it. Now, I won't bore
you with stories of debating word usage, but suffice it to
say that to this day I have dreams of being chased by the
Bluebook and the Redbook.
Justice Birch has been an encouraging friend to me
as I know he has been to his many other former clerks. He
is not afraid to give his opinion on a matter once solicited
and rarely holds back when he has something to say that he
believes can make a difference. He has given me advice on
just about everything ranging from the best colleges and
universities for my son to attend to what types of shrimp
make the best Louisiana gumbo. Don't worry, Judge, your
secret is safe with me.
I do take seriously his words of wisdom which I
know are not given at random. I, as do others, hold him in
the highest regard and greatly respect his opinion. Justice
Birch, I applaud you on receiving yet another great
accolade during your tenure on the Supreme Court. The
examples you have set during your most distinguished
career make you one who is most deserving. I hope what I
have said today comes through loud and clear that, if I
could, I would not go back and change a thing. It was a
privilege to work for you, sir. It was an invaluable
experience, and I am truly grateful for the opportunity you
gave. I know that I am a better writer and that I give a
better argument after having clerked for you.
As my own special tribute to you, I would like to
read you this poem on behalf of all of your former clerks:
Clerks all over this great Tennessee finally
call him the Judge.
An excellent writer he expects us to be;
On grammar andsyntax he won't budge.
Research and writing are skills most
desired, and a goodpersonality is a plus.
Punctualityis a skill you will to acquire,
Or Judge will surely make a fuss.
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But a better mentor we could not ask.
He's therefor us to the very end,
Guiding us all on our legalpath,
As our teacher, our mentor, ourfriend.
Thank you.
COMMENTS OF JUSTICE ADOLPHO A. BIRCH
JUSTICE ADOLPHO A. BIRCH: Justice White, Mr.
Hyder, participants, and those here at this prestigious
symposium where I have learned so much about torts and
about law and I guess about myself: I thought I would have
to get up and rebut a lot of things that Raney would say.
She has been extremely kind and generous to me, and I
appreciate it very much.
Raney is but one of many clerks that I have hired
from the University of Tennessee College of Law. My
practice was to hire a new clerk almost every year. By far,
Raney was among the top three that I have had, and I guess
I have had twenty or thirty clerks. Raney was certainly one
of the very best. I appreciated the time she spent with me.
I always tell my clerks, "It's a two-way street. It's
give and take. I hope that when you leave, you leave with
more than what you brought because you will teach me,
and I will teach you." Raney's progress as a lawyer has
convinced me that she has really taken a lot, and I can attest
to the fact that she has left a lot of learning with me also.
So I thank you, Raney and the other speakers, for the kind
things that you've said. It really, you know, is kind of-I
didn't think things would get to me, but sometimes they do.
I have also had a very, very wonderful relationship
with the University of Tennessee College of Law starting
back with Dean Wirtz. I have come up here many, many
times to participate in the events, and I have always felt that
I have received a great benefit from it. I appreciate that,
and I appreciate the opportunity to do this.
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Let me clarify one thing that I always want to leave
with you. I would be less than candid if I did not. I do
appreciate Raney mentioning that I have been the first this
and the first that, and it does mean something to me. There
is pride involved, but there is also the acknowledgment and
recognition that for everything that I have done first there
are many, many others who tried hard to get there and who
were thwarted and stymied and stopped by unconstitutional
prejudice and segregation. So while I do not want you to
think I am ungrateful-I am grateful-I just want to temper
it with the idea that those people who tried and were
rejected certainly deserve as much if not more credit than I
do.
I have had the pleasure of working with some very,
very distinguished persons both in the past and at present,
and if there is any thought I want to leave you with it is my
feeling, my confidence, that the Court is in good hands.
We leave Justice Barker in charge along with Justices
Holder and Clark. They are people who will carry the
Court forward and people who will advance what I think us
older folks set as the tone. We can be confident about that.
I told Justice Drowota I would give him some of my
time so I am going to finish up now by simply saying that I
have given the judiciary all that I have, and it in turn has
rewarded me profoundly with the opportunity to serve. To
me that is reward enough. I thank you very, very much.
INTRODUCTION
The final tribute to Justice
MR. JOSEPH HYDER:
Drowota will be by Lisa Rippy. Ms. Rippy is a staff
attorney for the Tennessee Supreme Court, and she has the
distinct honor of serving as a law clerk to two justices,
Justice Anderson and Justice Drowota.
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COMMENTS OF LISA RIPPY
MS. LISA RIPPY: I am happy to have been invited to
speak in honor of these three fine justices. I have spent the
last thirteen and a half years clerking because I do not like
public speaking, so I am a bit nervous today.
It has been really a blessing to me to be able to clerk
Justice
for Justice Anderson and Justice Drowota.
Anderson hired me straight out of law school, and I was
from a background with no lawyers in my family at all.
Justice Anderson patiently talked to me about the law and
his legal experience, taught me every facet of the Court's
work, and allowed me to be informed about that. I so
appreciate that. I still call upon the things that he taught me
about the Court to do my job. More than that I am grateful
for the fact that in 1996 when I decided to move back home
to Middle Tennessee he wished me well and encouraged
me to accept Justice Drowota's offer of a clerkship. I really
appreciate Justice Anderson for all he did for me.
When I began working for Justice Drowota I
already knew him to some degree. I also knew that he and
Justice Anderson were alike in many ways. For example,
as Rodd mentioned, they are both technologically
challenged, but they are learning in that regard. They also
both enjoy the same fine restaurants. I have personally
eaten at McDonald's on many occasions going to and from
court.
Their most important similarity is that they are
humble, modest, and calm leaders. Let me tell you a little
bit about Justice Drowota although you have heard already
about his contributions to Tennessee law. I will give you a
little background. He went on the chancery bench in
Nashville in 1970 where he remained until 1974 when he
was appointed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. He was
elected to the Supreme Court in 1980 where he served until
his retirement last September, a sad day for me, but as
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Justice Anderson mentioned, the Court allowed me to stay
on as a staff attorney. I appreciate that very much.
Justice Drowota authored thousands of opinions,
participated in thousands more, and is tremendously
accomplished professionally, but what a lot of people do
not know about Judge Drowota is what a wonderful person
he is to work for on a daily basis. I would like to talk to
you about that just a little bit. I was fortunate in that I
knew him somewhat when I began to work for him.
Otherwise, I would have probably been intimidated by his
many, many years of experience. He had ridden to court
with Justice Anderson and me on occasion, and I knew that
he was a sports fan and that he was a down-to-earth person.
I learned even more over the next nine years about what a
generous and genuinely nice person he is.
He seems to me to never have a negative thought
towards anyone, and he is almost incapable of believing
that anyone else has a negative thought towards him. It is
truly amazing. I do not know of any person in the world
other than Justice Drowota who seems not to have an
enemy. His generosity is well known among the members
of the Court as well. They appreciate his leadership style.
It is difficult to describe his generous spirit and his truly
genuine kindness and consideration towards everyone, not
just the Justices but the Supreme Court staff, the
Administrative Office of the Court staff, and the building
personnel. Justice Drowota knew them by name. He knew
their job, and he thanked them for it on a regular basis. He
was just genuinely nice and respectful towards everyone.
It sometimes seems strange to me that a person as
nice as Justice Drowota could enjoy as much as he did the
work of the Court, which is sometimes contentious and
sometimes requires strong debate, but he loved every
aspect of the Court's work. He was enthusiastic about it.
He was just as enthusiastic about it on the day he retired as
he was the day that I began clerking for him.
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He was attentive to every detail. Sometimes he
would be so enthusiastic about it that he could be annoying.
On those cold, rainy days when he was not feeling well and
we'd just gotten three memos from three different justices
saying, "We don't agree with your opinion that you worked
on for weeks," it seemed that he would become more
enthusiastic because he would be thinking of ways he could
persuade them to his point of view. I will tell you that I
was not as enthusiastic about those three memos
disagreeing with that opinion, but he always reminded me
that the Court was a team and that we were all working
towards the same goal: to render the best possible decision
for the litigants, for the law, and for the people of
Tennessee.
I
Beauty contests have "Miss Congeniality."
always thought that Justice Drowota should wear a sash
that said "Mr. Collegiality" because he focused on
improving the relationships among the justices, realizing
that unanimous or nearly unanimous opinions were more
definitive and that they provided lawyers and judges in
Tennessee with answers that people need to plan their lives
on a daily basis.
That is not to say that he compromises principle to
up
with a unanimous decision because he did not, but
come
he was aware of the importance of that. He was also aware
that it was more possible to have unanimous or nearly
unanimous decisions if the justices were able to work well
together. I think any of you who have read a Supreme
Court decision that was 5-4 with nine different opinions
can understand what a tremendous asset that is for the
Tennessee Supreme Court, which is a five member court,
because the closer to a unanimous decision the better it is.
He also understood the importance of timely issuing
decisions. He knew that litigants and real people were
waiting for those opinions. He knew that they had issues
that were important to their lives, and they needed an
answer. They didn't need it a year from now; they needed
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it as soon as possible after the Court had heard the case.
Justice Anderson said in a tribute letter about Justice
Drowota that his idea of the proper time to release an
opinion was immediately after oral argument, and that is
pretty close to the truth. When he was Chief Justice he had
the right to assign cases. He normally would assign
difficult cases that needed speedy answers to him because
he would get those opinions out as quickly as possible, and
he would work long and hard to do it.
His enthusiasm did not wane over the years and
neither did his work ethic. In the summer of last year when
he knew he had two or three months, he was coming in and
still looking at everything, still being careful about
everything, and still noticing if someone had the wrong
lawyer for oral argument on an opinion. He was that
careful and detailed, yet he was even tempered. I do not
recall ever seeing him upset enough to raise his voice. If he
had I'm not sure, but the building might have collapsed
around him. That is how much everyone in the Supreme
Court building in Nashville depended upon his evenkeeled, even-tempered conduct.
He was very concerned about my speaking very
long today. I do not know what he thought I could say that
would be negative about him because I could never come
up anything that would be negative about him. I can tell
you that he won the Titan's "Best-Dressed" because he had
on Titan's apparel the year that they went to the Super
Bowl. He participated in the lives and activities of the
Court.
I will end by reading a quote from one of his former
law clerks, Dexter Brewer, who is now a Catholic priest.
He said about Justice Drowota, and I think it's true that
"your presence on the high court brought wisdom and life
and vitality to that place where so many come to get an
answer to some of the most desperate questions of their
lives."
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I am grateful as a Tennessean that he gave thirtyfive years of his life and service to the courts of Tennessee.
I am also grateful as Justice Birch said that the Court now
has fine men and women to carry on the attitude of team
work that Justice Drowota was interested in establishing
and fostering among the Court. Again, I appreciate the
opportunity to speak here today.
COMMENTS OF JUSTICE FRANK F. DROWOTA
JUSTICE FRANK F. DROWOTA: Lisa, I want you to
come and do my funeral. That was beautiful. I am sorry
my wife could not be here today. Lisa was always kind and
generous in her words as you members of the Court know,
and I think the Court is very fortunate to have her stay on.
One of the smartest moves I ever made and I think the only
time that I felt I got the best of Riley Anderson was when I
stole Lisa from him about nine or ten years ago, and he
immediately went and stole Rodd from Justice Barker.
Lisa is really more than a law clerk or a staff attorney. Her
new title under me was "Chief of Staff to the Chief
Justice." She served in that capacity for Chief Justice
Barker. She has all these titles, but I think the title I would
give you is "good friend."
Marshall Davidson was my clerk back in 1990, and
Marshall and Lisa have been good friends. We try to have
lunch together at least once a month and discuss old times
and different things that are going on. I appreciate them
both. Marshall is an interesting person as you heard him
speak on tort law. He knows tort law backwards and
forwards, but there are little things you do not know about
him. I have seen him now for sixteen years and seen his
family grow. He forces his children to go to Disney World
every other summer. He claims they are the ones that want
to go. I have talked to his children, and they say, "Tell dad
we don't need to keep going back to Disney World." So,
Marshall, I'm telling you right now.
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On a serious note, I do want to thank the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy for this symposium and, in
particular, Justice Penny White and Professor Otis
Stephens. Penny, some of the most fun times were when
we served together. When Penny would come to Nashville
she and I would double date, and those were interesting
times. She would always-Riley and Al remember-grade
our ties. I am afraid I failed today. I want her to rule on
Riley's and Al's. She was tough on ties.
Both Rodd and Raney, you all were right on point
on Justice Anderson and Justice Birch. They have truly
served the state so well for so, so many years. I have
served with Riley for fifteen years, which is longer than I
have served with anyone, and Al for thirteen years, and I
have great respect and admiration for both. I have really
missed working with you guys. I really have.
Mickey Barker who is your Chief Justice now really
changed things on the Court. I always said he brought
humor to the Court, and I meant that in a very positive,
positive way because I think it is important for any
appellate court, any group of five people and the combined
staff, to have some humor. But he brought much more than
that as I have always said in my remarks discussing him.
He brings a great deal of intellect and common sense. You
know the Court is in good hands. You have got him
leading the Court. You have got Connie Clark up here at
the back. I appreciate both of them being here today. I
hope they did it out of respect for the judges they have
served with, and I know I speak for them when I say how
much we appreciate it.
Connie Clark took my place, and I could not have
been happier because I have never known anyone that is a
true workaholic. She and I worked closely, myself as Chief
over the last few years and she as the Director of the
Administrative Office of the Court. On Saturdays and
Sundays if I ever needed to reach her, which I often did, I
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didn't call her at home; I called her at the office, and she
would always be there. It was just truly amazing.
Let me tell you if I can in the time remaining a few
observations of the Supreme Court that I have made during
my thirty-five years on the bench and twenty-five of those
on the Court. We often refer to the Court in the late '60s
and early '70s as the "prior to the '74 Court" because we
talk about the '74 Court that really changed the way the
Court functioned and operated. But the Court prior to that
time we would describe as, what oftentimes people would
say, a "cold court": they would not have studied your
briefs ahead of time; they never really prepared for oral
argument; and, they never discussed the cases around the
circular table that we do. This is coming from judges who
served on that Court.
It was amazing that Ross Dyer who was Chief
Justice from '69 to '74 and who I think was an exceptional
leader was able to basically hold that Court together. I
think "dysfunctional," as some people have used the term,
is perhaps a little too strong, but they had personalities on
that Court who would not even speak with one another.
When they were holding court and staying in the hotel they
would come to get a cab to go to the courthouse, and they
would not take the same cab even though they were
standing together.
It was unfortunate in many ways, and yet they came
out with some excellent, excellent opinions because they
had some bright, bright people. But they did not really
function as you would think an appellate court would
necessarily function simply because of personal ties. I
remember when the Court of '74 was running. They made
certain pledges about what they would do if elected to the
Supreme Court, and one of the things was that they would
not have one-judge opinions. The reason they said that was
because the Court, like I said, never sat down and discussed
the cases together.
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They circulated their opinions and either signed
onto them or signed off, and most of the time, if you are
familiar with that Court, they were 5-0 opinions. With the
present court, a 5-0 opinion certainly is not a one-judge
opinion. A 5-0 opinion means that a lot of work and
compromise has gone into getting the Court together.
As Lisa pointed out, it is extremely important for
courts to have 5-0 or 4-1 opinions. In this era when you're
getting ready to lose two members of the Court and one
other went off last year, if most of the majority opinions
were 3-2 it would leave a lot of question marks in a lot of
people's minds. Fortunately, cases like McIntyre and others
have been 5-0 even though they were not close to that at the
beginning when the discussion started.
But the '74 Court that was basically five new judges
decided on various procedures and things that they wanted
to accomplish before they ran that particular summer. One
of the main things they decided was that they were going to
sit down together as a court and discuss the opinions and
work on them and be a willing collegial court and have an
opinion that was the opinion of the Tennessee Supreme
Court and not just one person.
In '76, as has been pointed out earlier by Lance,
they created the Board of Professional Responsibility. In
'78 they created the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In '79
they created the Rules of Appellate Procedure. In '79 the
Court of the Judiciary was established. They were really
described as an activist Court because they used their rulemaking powers. They hated people using that term for
them. They did not like to be called an activist court, but
they truly were.
I went on in '80. In '84 we had the Rules of
Juvenile Procedure. IOLTA (Interest on Lawyers Trust
Accounts) came on board in '84, and in '86 we had
mandatory CLE (Continuing Legal Education). In '88 the
Judicial Ethics Commission was created. In '89 the Court
started taking certified questions from the federal courts
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that I think helped very much in the development of
comparative fault. Many of those cases came through the
federal court system.
In '89 we also began the Client Protection Fund, and
in January of '90 the Rules of Evidence were established. It
is hard for young lawyers to believe that the Rules of
Evidence are that recent and that we did not have rules of
civil and criminal procedure until this "activist Court of
'74" came on board.
In 1990, we had three new members come on the
Court, and as I have often said, I think the Court of the '80s
left a solid foundation for the Court of the '90s on which to
continue, on which to build. In 1993 the Tennessee Plan,
the merit selection of appellate judges, came about, and I
think that is one of the true good things that we have in the
appellate court system.
But I guess the thing that meant the most was the
jurisdictional change in '93 when we began to be a pure
Rule 11 permission-to-appeal court or whatever you want
to call it. We became a law-development court and no
longer an error-correcting court in areas of workers'
compensation and other areas. I think that change in
jurisdiction materially strengthened the Court because then
the Court was able to deal with and pull up the cases that it
felt were important in trying to develop the law. In '95, as
Sue Allison said, SCALES came to be under the leadership
of -Riley Anderson. Riley brought so many new and
interesting things to the Court.
When I was Chief back in '89 and '90, I had heard
about a small SCALES program in Ohio, and I didn't even
bring it back to the Court for discussion because I didn't
think it would work. Riley had the vision to see that it
would work, and it is one of the most successful programs I
think we've had. It is difficult. It is hard. It requires a lot
of extra travel and extra court time, but I think it is
something, Riley, that has been very meaningful and is
showing its rewards.
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Penny, it's interesting that when we were doing a
SCALES project in Clinton-you probably remember it
because Sue said all of the young girl students would come
around you and want to have your picture taken. When
Gary Wade with the Judicial Conference Foundation gave a
scholarship to a Tennessee student, in her remarks to the
conference, she said, "The reason I wanted to go to law
school is because I attended a SCALES conference
program in Clinton, Tennessee when I was in high school,
and I got to sit next to and talk to Justice Penny White."
The profound impact you had on her is being felt by many,
many, many students. I am so glad the Foundation is now
able to give four scholarships a year to students.
Riley also created the Supreme Court Historical
Society. The Court of the '90s created a Commission on
Gender Fairness and a Commission on Racial and Ethnic
Fairness under the guidance of Al Birch. In '93, the Court
consolidated three appellate court clerks' offices under one
person. These were all things that were important to have
occurred.
But I feel the makeup of the Court is also revealing.
During the Court of the '80s, those ten years, there were six
white male justices. Most of them went to the same law
school, were in law school at the same time, and had the
same law professors. I do not know how you students are
impressed with your law professors, but most of them
followed pretty much in lock-step with their torts and
contracts professors.
It was interesting how Justices
Harbison and Cooper thought so much alike. During their
sixteen years together they only thought differently on two
cases where one dissented and one went the other way.
So the '74 to '90 Supreme Court was a great Court,
but it was not a real diverse Court. The '90 to '98 Court
was interesting in that during that eight year period there
were nine different judges. There was constantly changing
personnel and some lack of continuity and focus that
maybe the '80s Court had. However, it gained diversity not
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only in terms of gender and race but also in ideas and
points of view. I really think the areas of ideas and points
of view were so important.
The present Court is made up of people from five
different law schools. When they sit around the table they
certainly do not think alike because their backgrounds are
different, and yet they agree to disagree. I think it is very
important that it is a collegial court that you have now, a
court that respects one another. I think mutual respect is
certainly a necessary ingredient for any appellate court to
function properly.
The Court of 2006 through 2014-that chapter has
not been written yet, Carl. I hope you will write it for
them. I think it's going to be exciting because I know that
the three members that remain on the Court are brilliant
scholars and hard workers, and that's what it takes. With
Riley and Al leaving, I know one thing: Chief Justice
Barker, they will give you 110% until September 1 t comes.
I think all court observers are going to have a field
day for the next few years observing how you handle
things. You have already gotten one argument today from
John Day, so deduct five minutes off his argument next
time he's arguing a particular case on the pure form
comparative fault.
In closing, let me again thank the Tennessee
Journal of Law and Policy for hosting this symposium. It
was certainly great for the members of Court to get
together, and we appreciate what each of you had to say.
Thank you very much.
INTRODUCTION
MR. JOSEPH HYDER: Chief Justice Barker also wanted
to say a few words about his parting colleagues.
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COMMENTS OF CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM M.
BARKER
CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM M. BARKER: I want to
thank the people who have put this on. It has been a time
for us to reminisce on the Court and for you to get some
insight into these folks. This is a day that will be a
highlight for me.
Someone told me one time-if you'll think about it
you may tend to agree-that if you can count on your hand
five real, real friends you are pretty fortunate. I can count
on my right hand five friends: these three here, Connie
Clark, and Justice Janice Holder who is over in Memphis
and was unable to be here today. We are not only
colleagues in the sense of getting our work out and doing
the business of the Court, we think, in a professional way.
I can tell you that we are really close friends, and I miss
these guys.
So I just want you to know that even though I had
the privilege of serving eight years with them, it was
apparently-Frank, as you can tell from his talk, is the
historian of the group-about as long as a group of five
people without a chance have served in about twenty-five
or thirty years. It's more than that he says. So this is a
change for us.
Do you realize that within the space of twelve
months with the retirement of these three folks and even
with the optimistic and hopeful assumption that I along
with Justices Holder and Clark will be retained this
summer, this Court will undergo a 60% turnover? I'm
looking forward to it. As Frank has indicated, we have got
some pretty good things to build on. I am very confident.
The first thing I want you to know as you sit here
today is that now that you are all retired, as the Chief
Justice, I have to fill vacancies from time to time when
people are sick or have conflicts. Justice Birch, I am going
to appoint you to go to Pickett County to try a boundary
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line dispute. Justice Drowota, I am going to appoint you to
go to Lake County, and I want you to try a bad ax-murder
case. Justice Anderson, I am going to send you down to
Bedford County where you can try a custody dispute. That
way you will stay in touch. Thanks for letting us be here
today.
COMMENTS OF PROFESSOR PENNY WHITE
PROFESSOR PENNY WHITE: Thank you so much,
Justices Barker and Clark, for being here and all the other
judges in the audience. Will policy journal staff members
please stand including Lee Evans, last year's editor.
As you can tell from this program, there has been a
lot of work put into it. There is one person who put more
work into it than is imaginable and who has managed to
make herself absent from the stage. Maha, will you please
come and accept a little token of appreciation from the
policy staff? This is Maha Ayesh. She has been the
working oar behind this program, so join me in thanking
her.
Justices, you are going to need something to do now
that you are retired. The journal staff has a gift for each of
you. This includes a subscription to the Tennessee Journal
of Law and Policy. This is a small gift for each of you
from the journal staff.
This is the first time in a long, long time that I have
regretted not having longer to serve with you gentlemen.
It's not that I didn't regret it a long time ago, but I got over
that. One of the reasons that I regretted it so much today is
that it just feels unbelievable that I had the opportunity to
work with you all and to be a small part of what we have
heard about today. It's overwhelming to me, and it's
overwhelming to know really the contribution you all have
made.
I hope as you sat there that each of you has taken
some time and reflected really upon your greatness because
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that's what this has been about. It is, I know for me
personally, such an honor that each of you would come out
of retirement or almost retirement to be here. So thank you
for being here.
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THE RETIREMENT OF CHIEF JUSTICE FRANK F. DROWOTA,

III: A TRIBUTE TO A LEGAL LEGEND AND ALL AROUND

NICE GUY
Lisa Rippy and Marshall Davidson'

Chief Justice Frank F. Drowota, III retires in the
summer of 2006, ending a distinguished thirty-five year
His twenty-five year tenure on the
judicial career.
Tennessee Supreme Court is the second-longest in state
history.2 He will leave behind an excellent record of
service to the judiciary and to the state. Indeed, retired
Chief Justice William H.D. Fones recently described Chief
Justice Drowota as one of the greatest chief justices in
Tennessee history. This article will discuss Chief Justice
Drowota's vast contributions to Tennessee's legal system
and along the way, will attempt to provide some insight
into his judicial philosophy, personality, and character.
The Making of a Supreme Court Justice
Born in Kentucky, five-year-old Francis Ferdinand
Drowota, III (known then as "Frankie") moved to Nashville
in 1943 when his father became the founding minister at
Woodmont Christian Church. Dr. Drowota left a thriving
church with a congregation of 2,000 to become the minister
of a new church with a congregation of fifty-two.
For several years, the church met in one part of a
three-story house while the Drowota family lived in the
other part of the house. Despite the changes wrought in his
1 Lisa Rippy has been Chief Justice Drowota's law clerk since 1996
and will be his last. Marshall Davidson was his law clerk in 1990-91
and is currently a Supreme Court Staff Attorney.
2 Grafton Green, who served on the Tennessee Supreme Court from
1910 until 1947, is the only justice who has served longer than Chief
Justice Drowota.
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life by his father's calling, Frankie looked up to his father
and even relished his role as a "preacher's kid." In fact, he
was part of a group of young boys who church members
dubbed the "Wood Monsters" for their mischief
in
3
floor.
church
the
onto
balcony
a
from
throwing chairs
At Montgomery Bell Academy where he attended
school, Frankie matured into a scholar and an athlete. He
graduated near the top of his class in 1956.
Not
surprisingly to those who know Chief Justice Drowota, his
peers voted him "Most Friendly." He played baseball,
basketball, and ran track, but above all Frankie excelled in
football. In fact, he scored a crucial touchdown in a state
championship game before a crowd of 20,000. His team
won the state championship, and the press reported the
heroics of "Ace Halfback Drowota," "Skeeter Drowota,"
"Eagle Killer Drowota," and the "Flying Maroon," touting
his quickness and fearless play on the football field. Chief
Justice Drowota credits his football coach, Tommy Owen,
for teaching him at a young age the importance of
"discipline, team work, goal-setting, and a healthy
lifestyle." He also attributes much of his later success in
the legal world to the academic and leadership training that
he received at Montgomery Bell Academy.
Chief Justice Drowota attended Vanderbilt
University where he continued playing football. In 1958,
The Tennessean reported that "pint-sized" Drowota was
"mighty hard to stop even if you get your hands on him.
Much of the time you just can't get a solid lick on him."

Chief Justice Drowota maintains that he rarely misbehaved during his
childhood. However, he recalls that on one occasion his father took
him outside to deliver a spanking with a switch. Dr. Drowota told his
son that "this will hurt me more than it does you." Young Frankie
replied, "Dad, I don't want this to hurt you, so let's just call it even."
To his surprise, his father agreed.
3
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However, a knee injury sustained during his junior year
ended his football career.
After graduating from Vanderbilt in 1960 with a
degree in history and political science, Chief Justice
Drowota entered the United States Navy as an ensign. He
served aboard an aircraft carrier in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean and was placed in charge of a 200 man
gunnery division. This assignment required that he quickly
learn how to deal with persons of all ages and backgrounds.
Chief Justice Drowota fondly recalls that his time in the
Navy taught him to set goals for himself and for his
division and to continually reevaluate his goals. These
skills would later prove useful in leading Tennessee's
judicial branch of government.
When Chief Justice Drowota entered the Navy,
attending law school had not crossed his mind. His parents
had hoped that he would follow in his father's footsteps and
become a minister, but his destiny lay elsewhere. Unsure
of a career, he took the Law School Admissions Test
aboard an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean Sea. He
resolved that if he did well on the test, he would go to law
school upon completing his military service. Although the
test-taking environment was not ideal, he received a high
score and promptly applied to Vanderbilt Law School.
In 1962, Chief Justice Drowota returned to
Nashville and earned his law degree at Vanderbilt Law
School while continuing to serve in the Naval Reserve as a
commander in the Judge Advocate General's Corps.
During this time, he met Claire Hooper at a youth camp
where they both worked as counselors. When Claire left
Nashville to attend Wellesley College in Boston, they
corresponded almost daily. They married in 1965. Forty
years, two children, and five grandchildren later, Chief
Justice Drowota is quick to point out that Claire is still the
love of his life.
Chief Justice Drowota practiced law in Nashville
until 1970 when he was appointed by Governor Buford
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Ellington to the bench of the Chancery Court of Davidson
County. There, he began to learn the art of judging and
grew confident in his decision to pursue a legal career. He
worked long hours six or seven days a week alongside
Nashville's only other chancellor, Ben Cantrell, as the two
young judges honed their budding skills as jurists. Chief
Justice Drowota continues to have a "real appreciation for
the hard work and long hours our trial judges put in"
because he has done it himself. He recalls that his "four
years on the Davidson County chancery bench were some
of the most rewarding times as a judge I had because that's
where the real action is, and you get to see the great
lawyers apply their trade."
Chancery Court was also the site of his most
embarrassing moment as a judge. It happened after a
recess during a trial involving some of Nashville's most
prominent attorneys. Chancellor Drowota sat down and
leaned back as he normally did, but the chair flipped
backward, catapulting him onto the floor and sending his
feet flying toward the ceiling. He describes the incident as
"every judge's worst nightmare" but also a lesson in
humility.
After spending four years in the trenches of a busy
trial court, Chancellor Drowota was appointed by Governor
Winfield Dunn to the court of appeals in 1974, where he
served until his election in 1980 to the Tennessee Supreme
Court. At age forty-two, he began his tenure on the
Supreme Court alongside four experienced and wellrespected justices: William J. Harbison, William H.D.
Fones, Ray L. Brock, Jr., and Robert E. Cooper. Justice
Drowota was not intimidated at the prospect of working
beside these older and more experienced judges because he
was accustomed to working with people much older than
himself on the court of appeals, such as Henry Todd and
Tom Shriver. Although Justice Drowota's new colleagues
on the Supreme Court treated him as an equal, they also
afforded him the benefit of their experience. He earned
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their full respect and confidence, and they selected him to
serve as Chief Justice in 1989 when he was just fifty-one
years old. His second term as Chief Justice, which ended
upon his retirement, began in 2001.
Contributions to Tennessee's Substantive Law
During his more than thirty years as an appellate
judge, Chief Justice Drowota has participated in more than
4,500 decisions. He has authored at least 1,000 majority
opinions and more than 100 dissenting and concurring
opinions. Many thousands of cases seeking Supreme Court
review have passed over his desk.
Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Drowota has
stamped his impression across the full scope of Tennessee's
common law. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
area of torts, his favorite area of the law. He believes his
single most significant authored opinion to be McIntyre v.
Balentine,4 in which the court adopted comparative fault,
thereby completely reshaping Tennessee tort law. Chief
Justice Drowota also authored many of the subsequent5
opinions which defined the contours of comparative fault
and which explained how comparative fault affects other7
6
established principles, such as contribution, strict liability,
and vicarious liability.8
Readily acknowledging that
formulating workable and meaningful standards to guide
courts in apportioning fault is "no simple matter," Chief
Justice Drowota has endeavored along with the court as a

4 McIntyre
5 See, e.g.,

v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d. 52 (Tenn. 1992).
Eaton v. McClain, 891 S.W.2d 587 (Tenn. 1994).
6 See, e.g., Bervoets v. Harde Rails Pontiac-Olds, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 905
(Tenn. 1994).
7 See, e.g., Whitehead v. Toyota Motor Corp., 897 S.W.2d 684 (Tenn.
1995).
8 See, e.g., Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308 (Tenn. 1998).
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whole to provide guidance "however
imprecise and
9
imperfect" that guidance may be.
In addition to writing many of the court's major
comparative fault decisions, Chief Justice Drowota has
significantly shaped Tennessee tort law in the areas of
punitive damages,' 0 invasion of privacy,1' premises
liability,' 2 nuisance,' 3 negligent, reckless, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, 14 products liability, 5
malicious prosecution,1 6 and abuse of process.17 Moreover,
he has authored key decisions concerning governmental
immunity,' 8 medical and legal malpractice, 19 the family
purpose doctrine, 20 and even unusual
topics such as loss of
22
2 1 and wrongful pregnancy.
chance

9Eaton, 891 S.W.2d at 591.

10 See, e.g., Hodges v. S.C. Toof& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992).
11See, e.g., West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640
(Tenn. 2001).
12See, e.g., Blair v. West Town Mail, 130 S.W.3d 761 (Tenn. 2004);
Blair v. Campbell, 924 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. 1996).
13See, e.g., Lane v. W.J. Curry & Sons, 92 S.W.3d 355 (Tenn. 2002).
14 See, e.g., Doe I ex rel. Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Nashville, 154 S.W.3d 22 (Tenn. 2005); Leach v. Taylor, 124 S.W.3d
87 (Tenn. 2004); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. 1997); Ramsey
v. Beavers, 931 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1996); Camper v. Minor, 915
S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1996).
'5 See, e.g., Davis v. Komatsu Am. Indus. Corp., 42 S.W.3d 34 (Tenn.
2001).
16 See, e.g., Roberts v. Fed. Express Corp., 842 S.W.2d (Tenn. 1992).
17 See, e.g., Bell ex rel. Snyder v. Icard, 986 S.W.2d 550 (Tenn. 1999).
18See, e.g., Bowers ex rel. Bowers v. City of Chattanooga, 826 S.W.2d
427 (Tenn. 1992).
'9 See, e.g., Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3d 103 (Tenn. 2001) (regarding
legal malpractice); John Kohl & Co., P.C. v. Dearborn & Ewing, 977
S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. 1998) (regarding legal malpractice); Cardwell v.
Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987) (regarding medical
malpractice).
20 See, e.g., Camper v. Minor, 915 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1996).
21See,
22 See,

e.g., Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594 (Tenn. 1993).
e.g., Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1987).
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The scope of Chief Justice Drowota's contribution
to civil law is by no means limited to torts. He has
authored significant opinions on a wide array of subjects
from workers' compensation and tax cases to regulatory
matters. 23 In addition, his opinions comprise probate and
estate disputes, 24 civil procedure, 25 election law, 26 domestic
29
2
relations, 27 landlord and tenant law, 1 jurisdiction,
employment matters, insurance law, 3 1 evidence, 32 contract
36
35
34
securities law,
disputes, 33 remedies,

consumer law,

civil rights,37 and constitutional law.38
Although Chief Justice Drowota began his career as a
chancellor, he has authored many important criminal law
decisions during his twenty-five years on the Tennessee
Supreme Court. He has participated in nearly every death
penalty appeal since capital punishment was reinstated in
1977. Consequently, he has authored significant capital23

See, e.g., King v. Pope, 91 S.W.3d 314 (Tenn. 2002).
See, e.g., In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643 (Tenn. 2003).
25 See, e.g., Lacy v. Cox, 152 S.W.3d 480 (Tenn. 2004); Byrd v. Hall,
24

847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993).
26 See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Shelby County Election Comm'n, 146
S.W.3d 531 (Tenn. 2004).
27 See, e.g., Alford v. Alford, 120 S.W.3d 810 (Tenn. 2003).
28 See, e.g., Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson, 38 S.W.3d 504 (Tenn.
2001).
29 See, e.g., Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727 (Tenn. 2000).
30 See, e.g., Cantrell v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 53 S.W.3d 659
(Tenn. 2001).
31See, e.g., Griffin v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 18 S.W.3d 195 (Tenn.
2000);
Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845 (Tenn. 1998).
32
See e.g., Davidson v. Lindsey, 104 S.W.3d 483 (Tenn. 2003).
33 See, e.g., Alexander v. Armentrout, 24 S.W.3d 267 (Tenn. 2000).
34 See, e.g., Concrete Spaces, Inc. v. Sender, 2 S.W.3d 901 (Tenn.
1999).
35 See, e.g., Wakefield v. Crawley, 6 S.W.3d 442 (Tenn. 1999).
36 See, e.g., Hathaway v. First Family Fin. Serv., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 634
(Tenn.
1999).
37
See, e.g., Rowe v. Bd. of Educ., 938 S.W.2d 351 (Tenn. 1996).
38 See, e.g., Walker v. Bd. of Prof I Responsibility, 38 S.W.3d 540
(Tenn. 2001).
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case opinions which have addressed such issues as victim
impact evidence, 39 comparative proportionality review,44°
pre-execution claims of incompetence, 41 the introduction of
mental health evidence at sentencing, 42 prosecutorial
discretion in seeking the death penalty, 43 the introduction of
mitigation evidence, 44 the constitutionality of aggravating
circumstances,4645 and the constitutionality of the death
penalty itself.
His influence has been equally as great in
noncapital criminal cases. From interpreting the Criminal
Sentencing Reform Act of 198947 to abolishing common
law doctrines such as the year-and-a-day rule,4 8 Chief
Justice Drowota's opinions have modernized Tennessee's
criminal law. Moreover, his opinions have provided
guidance on difficult evidentiary questions, such as the
admissibility
of computer-generated
animations,49

39 See, e.g., State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872 (Tenn. 1998).
40

See, e.g., State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997); State v.

Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1988).

41 See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 134 S.W.3d 168 (Tenn. 2004); Coe v.

State, 17 S.W.3d 193 (Tenn. 2000); Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257
(Tenn. 1999).
42 See, e.g., State v. Reid, 981 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1998).
43 See, e.g., State v. Phipps, 959 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1997); State v.
Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503 (Tenn. 1997).
44 See, e.g., State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1997); State v.
Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346 (Tenn. 1997).
45 See, e.g., State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759 (Tenn. 2001); State v.
Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489 (Tenn. 1997); Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d at 465;
State v. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn. 1987).
46 See, e.g., State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991).
47 TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 40-35-101 (1989); see, e.g., State v. Lavender,

967 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Reeves, 916 S.W.2d 909 (Tenn.
1996).
48 See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393 (Tenn. 1999).
49
See, e.g., State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188 (Tenn. 2001).
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polygraph evidence, 50 and expert testimony regarding a
defendant's mental state. 51 Not only have Chief Justice
Drowota's opinions provided authoritative analyses of
52
Tennessee's insanity and diminished capacity defenses,
but his opinions have also 53clarified numerous constitutional
criminal procedure issues.
To be sure, Chief Justice Drowota's opinions, both
civil and criminal, have served to update Tennessee law
and bring it in line with much of the rest of the country. He
has written in a concise style with a common-sense focus
on making the law clear to judges, lawyers, and the public.
A Drowota opinion, forged from practical realities, tells
busy readers what they need to know. The opinions speak
with strength and clarity. They are promptly issued as well.
Chief Justice Drowota is keenly aware that few things
cause litigants and their lawyers more frustration and the
judiciary more criticism than the failure of courts to decide
cases on a reasonably prompt basis.
Cases that come before the Tennessee Supreme
Court routinely involve difficult legal issues which are
susceptible to more than one resolution. Respectable
arguments often support each opposing party's position,
and the legal issues almost always implicate a variety of
50

See, e.g., State v. Damron, 151 S.W.3d 510 (Tenn. 2004); State v.

Pierce, 138 S.W.3d 820 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44
(Tenn. 2001).
51 See, e.g., State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662 (Tenn. 1997).
52 See, e.g., State v. Flake, 114 S.W.3d 487 (Tenn. 2003); State v.
Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679
(Tenn. 1997).
53 See State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420 (Tenn. 2000); Momon v. State,
18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn.
1998); State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn. 1998); State v.
Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d
487 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Vineyard, 958 S.W.2d 730 (Tenn. 1997);
State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Cauley, 863
S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Ballard, 836 S.W.2d 560 (Tenn.
1992).
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moral, political, economic, and social concerns. Keenly
mindful of this, Chief Justice Drowota has placed a
premium on obtaining the consensus of the court. He
believes that issuing a unanimous opinion, which singularly
and unambiguously voices the authority of the entire court
as an institution, is particularly important. To achieve this
result, he often stressed areas of agreement. He has served
as a mediator, drawing the justices together with a
diplomatic and respectful style. Nevertheless, he has
shown respect to dissenting views, and he has taken the
initiative to dissent when even his best efforts have not
resulted in a consensus.
Chief Justice Drowota strongly believes the law
should be predictable and clear to all; however, he is bold
enough to depart from precedent in forging a new path
whether in a majority or a dissenting opinion when he is
Time has often
convinced a change is necessary.
vindicated him. For example, he dissented in a case in
which the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to abolish
parental immunity as an absolute bar to a child's recovery
for negligence. 54 Nine years later, this court adopted the
rationale of his dissenting opinion.55 His view became the
law. This scenario has occurred on more than one
occasion, which is a credit both to his legal scholarship and
to his foresight.56
Chief Justice Drowota, however, has never been on
an ideological mission in performing his work as a judge.
He has strived above all else to do right by the parties and
to make the law as clear and as sensible as possible.

Barranco v. Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tenn. 1985) (Drowota,
J., dissenting).
54

55 Broadwell ex rel. Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn.
1994).
56 See Nevill v. City of Tullahoma, 756 S.W.2d 226, 233 (Tenn. 1988)
(Drowota, J., dissenting), overruled by Haynes v. Hamilton County,
883 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tenn. 1994).
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Contributions to the Administration of Justice
In addition to deciding cases and writing opinions,
Tennessee Supreme Court justices are entrusted with a
and management
wide array of administrative
responsibilities. The justices, particularly the Chief Justice,
must spend considerable time on the management and
policy agenda of the judicial branch. To that end, the
justices serve as liaisons to various judicial department
boards and commissions and work closely with the
Chief Justice
Administrative Office of the Courts.
Drowota's administrative focus has been on improving and
modernizing Tennessee's judiciary and legal profession.
His ability to embrace needed change has enabled him to
succeed in this endeavor.
Chief Justice Drowota often has remarked that
gender and racial diversity has fostered an interchange of
ideas and perspectives that has greatly improved the legal
Technologically, Chief
profession and the judiciary.
Justice Drowota recalls with trepidation manual
typewriters, carbon paper, rotary telephones, the extensive
travel required by in-person court meetings, and the many
hours spent verbally announcing opinions in open court.
He has fully supported the use of technology to improve the
work of the judiciary, such as the use of computerized word
processing and legal research, electronic mail, video
conferencing, cellular telephones, the internet, and a
website where opinions are posted. He has also embraced
alternative dispute resolution as a means of easing court
dockets.
Not only does Chief Justice Drowota embrace
needed change but he has been courageous enough to
advocate it. While serving as Chief Justice in 1989, he
urged adoption of Supreme Court Rule 23, which allows
federal courts to certify questions of state law to the
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proven

invaluable to the development of Tennessee law,
particularly tort law. Moreover, he introduced and assisted
in developing the Lawyers Fund for Client Protection.
While advocating change, he has also honored
history, a topic of great interest to him. He assisted Justice
E. Riley Anderson in establishing the Tennessee Supreme
Court Historical Society. He worked with the Historical
Society and the Frist Foundation to honor Tennessee's
appellate judges with marble plaques in each Supreme
Court Building. He raised awareness about the Tennessee
Supreme Court by distributing A History of the Tennessee
Supreme Court to Tennessee high schools. 58 More
recently, Chief Justice Drowota urged lawyers to increase
access to justice by volunteering for pro bono programs and
helped publicize the availability of free or low-cost legal
services to low income Tennesseans. To this end, he has
filmed public service announcements, given speeches,
hosted luncheons, and written newspaper articles on 59the
subject. These articles have attracted national attention.
Other initiatives have stemmed from Chief Justice
Drowota's ability to efficiently and effectively manage
time and resources. For example, he drafted internal
operating rules for the Tennessee Supreme Court, which
include opinion circulation deadlines and which delineate
the administrative responsibilities of each justice's office.
He has worked to obtain funding for additional senior judge
appointments and to provide adequate judicial resources for
judges who are unable to serve due to conflicts, illness, or
active military duty.

57

TENN. SUP. CT.

R. 23.

58 A HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT

(Theodore Brown,

Jr., James W. Ely, Jr., & Carl A. Pierce eds., 2002).
59 See Frank F. Drowota, III, Even Tennessee's Neediest Can Find Help
Getting Their Day in Court, THE TENNESSEAN, Jan. 2, 2005, at 19A.
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In lean budget years, Chief Justice Drowota found
innovative ways to conserve scarce resources without
interrupting essential services.
Trial courts statewide
actually gained access to computer-based research during
this time. The Code Commission, which he chaired,
negotiated a long-term contract ensuring that Tennessee's
statutory compilation will remain the least expensive in the
country.
Because of his commitment to manage
conscientiously the Indigent Defense Fund, which has
grown from 1.45 million dollars in 1980 to over 17 million
dollars in 2004, he undertook the difficult task of
overhauling Supreme Court Rule 13.60 This rule governs
the qualifications and compensation of appointed lawyers.
Chief Justice Drowota's willingness to be a hands-on
manager and to undertake thankless administrative tasks
explains, in large part, how the judiciary remained
relatively unaffected by budget cuts.
Perhaps Chief Justice
Drowota's greatest
contribution to the administration of justice has been his
willingness to serve both as the court's mediator and as its
goodwill ambassador. Although he has never shied away
from candid discussions or vigorous debates, he has
evinced an unfailing ability to remain courteous, optimistic,
and proactive even in tense and difficult situations. Never
arrogant, and self-confident enough to hear and to consider
opposing views, he sincerely welcomes constructive
criticism. Because of these characteristics, Chief Justice
Drowota has developed excellent working relationships
with his colleagues in the judiciary, with legislators and
executive-branch officials, with members of the boards and
commissions to which he serves as court liaison, and with
lawyers and bar associations across Tennessee. Chief
Justice Drowota has earned the admiration and respect of
many, and the goodwill which he has created undoubtedly

60 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 13.
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will pay dividends for the judiciary for many years to
come.
The Man behind the Robe
When Chief Justice Drowota was sworn in as
Chancellor, Dr. Drowota's advice to his son came, not
surprisingly, from scripture. Dr. Drowota advised the new
judge to "do justly, love mercy, walk humbly with your
God.' '6 These words eloquently describe Chief Justice
Drowota's approach both to his public and private life. His
parents, whom he describes "as caring people who always
went out of their way to help others in need and did so with
complete modesty," were able to instill in their son these
same character traits.
Chief Justice Drowota treats
everyone fairly and respectfully.
He is thoughtful,
considerate, and truly interested in the lives of the people
around him. Perhaps most remarkable is the humility, the
mark of a just and merciful person, that he exhibits after so
many years of service in a high public office.
Outstanding appellate judges have certain traits in
common. They are bright, diligent, prompt, trustworthy,
fair, unbiased, tolerant of opposing views, and eventempered. They are keenly aware that the law involves
people, not just legal principles. Chief Justice Drowota
possesses each of these qualities in abundance. He leads
and encourages with dignity, grace, and class.
He
supervises large numbers of people without using critical or
sharp words. He is in the office early and is often the last
to leave in the evening. On vacations and trips, he takes
work along in order to "study" as he puts it. He does his
homework no matter what, and he is always prepared for
oral argument. His work ethic, which is characterized by
energy and enthusiasm, has set a high standard for all who
work with him.
61 Micah

6:8 (King James).
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Equally impressive are Chief Justice Drowota's
administrative and organizational skills. More than once
while discussing an obscure legal issue with a subordinate,
he would pull from his many files an old, unpublished
opinion that was right on point. Briefs and other materials
are stacked neatly throughout his office. He knows exactly
what is in each stack and what needs to be done to move
the matter along. His desk and office reflect a well-ordered
mind.
Despite his important public office, Chief Justice
Drowota's identity is defined more by personal
relationships than by his profession. He has not allowed
his career to become the sum total of who or what he is.
Balancing professional demands with the richness of
family, friends, and faith is a difficult undertaking. Chief
Justice Drowota has accomplished this balance. His
example has proven to other judges and lawyers that
balance is possible and that a person of character and
integrity can achieve both professional success and
personal happiness.
Reflecting this balance, Chief Justice Drowota
admits as he prepares to retire that he will miss his work on
the court because he feels "a certain sense of satisfaction in
dealing with hard legal issues that affect society." But, he
will miss most of all the "wonderful people I have been
associated with, from my colleagues on the court to the
wonderful staff to the great folks in the clerk's office." He
says of his amazing career in the law that the "whole
experience has been far more exciting and fulfilling than
[he] ever could have anticipated." With his usual modesty,
Chief Justice Drowota would like the legal community to
remember him simply as a "conscientious, fair-minded
judge with good common sense and integrity who treated
all with courtesy and respect." To be sure, his sense of
justice and fair play has brought high honor to himself and
to the Supreme Court.
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Conclusion
Tennessee's judiciary has been well managed and
generally holds the confidence of the executive and
legislative branches and the people. This is a high
compliment to Chief Justice Drowota's stewardship and a
wonderful legacy to his successors. All who have been
fortunate enough to work with Chief Justice Drowota will
long admire him both as a legal legend and as an all around
nice guy and will always strive to follow his example in our
careers and in life. We thank him for his mentorship, his
friendship, his example, and his counsel. Chief Justice
Drowota's influence has made our lives richer. Our parting
wish is that he long enjoys his rich family life and the
rewards of friends and faith that he so much deserves and
so highly values.
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